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THE WORKERS’ CONSTITUTION
Luke Norris*
This Article argues that the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Social
Security Act of 1935, and Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 should be
understood as a “workers’ constitution.” The Article tells the history of how
a connected wave of social movements responded to the insecurity that wage
earners faced after the Industrial Revolution and Great Depression by
working with government officials to bring about federal collective
bargaining rights, wage and hour legislation, and social security legislation.
It argues that the statutes are tied together as a set of “small c” constitutional
commitments in both their histories and theory. Each statute sought to
redefine economic freedom for workers around security and sought to
position worker security as essential to the constitutional accommodation of
corporate capitalism. The Article also explores the interpretive implications
of conceiving of a “workers’ constitution” in the current context.
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INTRODUCTION
Across the legal landscape today, the federal laws that once protected
workers’ rights are unraveling in important ways. Workers face mounting
hurdles to bargaining collectively, and unionization levels have dipped to an
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all-time low,1 with effects on income inequality and insecurity.2 Workers
have less job security, and increasingly their relationships with firms are
being defined so as to unbundle the protections afforded by law.3 The future
and strength of social security are in peril, and social security fails to offer
the old-age and unemployment security it once delivered.4 The federal
minimum wage has been stagnant for some time, and workers in the gig
economy are increasingly categorized so as to fall outside of its protections.5
And courts are increasingly using the First Amendment to fashion “neoLochnerian” doctrines that further weaken worker protections in the name of
corporate or individual opt-out rights.6 At the same time, new rights
movements have formed to strengthen social insurance,7 raise the minimum
wage,8 and to find novel ways to provide workers with representation and
protection in the global economy.9

1. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow, A Positive Right to Free Labor, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
859, 892–93 (2016) (“Union density in the United States has declined to an all-time low.”).
See generally SOPHIA Z. LEE, THE WORKPLACE CONSTITUTION FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE
NEW RIGHT (2014).
2. See, e.g., Nicholas Kristof, The Cost of a Decline in Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/19/opinion/nicholas-kristof-the-cost-of-a-declinein-unions.html [https://perma.cc/Q4Y5-BTEU].
3. See generally, e.g., KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS:
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); DAVID WEIL, THE
FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE
TO IMPROVE IT (2014).
4. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, A NEW DEAL FOR OLD AGE: TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE
RETIREMENT (2016); Steve Benen, Social Security Faces Threat from ‘Ideological War,’
MSNBC (Feb. 12, 2015, 12:36 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/rachel-maddow-show/socialsecurity-faces-threat-ideological-war [https://perma.cc/35DH-SW2B].
5. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, How the $15 Minimum Wage Went from Laughable to
Viable, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/03/sunday-review/howthe-15-minimum-wage-went-from-laughable-to-viable.html [http://perma.cc/H2YM-kHAL].
6. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge to Public
Accommodation Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1233 (2014); Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early
Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1915, 1917–18 (2016); Elizabeth
Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1453 (2015); Tim Wu, The
Right to Evade Regulation, NEW REPUBLIC (June 3, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/
113294/how-corporations-hijacked-first-amendment-evade-regulation
[https://perma.cc/
3T35-4ULU]. For an account of the U.S. Supreme Court’s neoliberal approach, see David
Singh Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 626 (2014), and see also David
Singh Grewal & Jedidiah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2014).
7. See, e.g., Mark Miller, Calls for Social Security Expansion Grow Louder in
Washington, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/your-money/
calls-for-social-security-expansion-grow-louder-in-washington.html [https://perma.cc/B2T542JT].
8. See, e.g., Lydia DePillis, It’s Not Just Fast Food: The Fight for $15 Is for Everyone
Now, WASH. POST (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/storyline/wp/2014/
12/04/its-not-just-fast-food-the-fight-for-15-is-for-everyone-now/ [https://perma.cc/79YKT3ZD].
9. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, AGENDA FOR REFORM: THE FUTURE OF EMPLOYMENT
RELATIONSHIPS AND THE LAW 166 (1993). See generally Kate Andrias, Building Labor’s
Constitution, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1591 (2016); Benjamin I. Sachs, The Unbundled Union: Politics
Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L.J. 148 (2013).

1462

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

All of the challenged legal regimes described above—which provide
workers with collective bargaining rights, unemployment insurance, and the
minimum wage—were established during the New Deal. Indeed, New Deal
worker legislation has an important constitutional lineage. The legislation
was seen by many citizens and government officials as creating new rights
and was won during a constitutional battle over Congress’s regulatory
authority.10 Today, the unraveling of those commitments and the related
arrival of what some call a “Second Gilded Age” of vast economic inequality
and insecurity has drawn many scholars back toward thinking about the
relationship between constitutional law and economic ordering—and, as a
result, inevitably back toward the New Deal.11
The New Deal is a foundational moment that established the architecture
of federal economic regulation. In this Article, I argue that we should
understand a core part of it differently. I recreate a significant part of the
New Deal constitutional transformation from the bottom up, exploring how
an interconnected set of movements engaged with political leaders in the
process of enacting the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA),12
which provided workers with collective bargaining rights; the Social Security
Act of 1935 (SSA),13 which provided workers with unemployment and oldage insurance; and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA),14 which
established federal minimum wage and hour guarantees. I argue that the
statutes were connected in their histories and in their conjoined effort to
provide workers with economic security rights and have become part of the
constitutive “web of practices, institutions, norms, and traditions that
structure American society,”15 sometimes called “small c” constitutional
commitments. While legal scholars have explored separately the histories of
the NLRA and SSA, and have paid comparatively less attention to the FLSA,
this Article both tells different stories of the statutes’ enactment16 and is the
first to capture the fuller history of the three statutes’ connection and
significance.17
While acknowledging the ossification and withering of these statutes
today, most of the Article is dedicated to telling the histories of their
10. See infra Parts I.A, II–IV.
11. See infra notes 19, 440. This literature is sometimes called a “constitutional political
economy” literature. See, e.g., Joseph Fishkin & William Forbath, Reclaiming Constitutional
Political Economy: An Introduction to the Symposium on the Constitution and Economic
Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1287, 1290 (2016) (“[A]rguments about constitutional political
economy begin from the premises that economics and politics are inextricable and that our
constitutional order rests on and presupposes a political-economic order.”).
12. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169
(2012)).
13. Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
14. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219
(2012)).
15. Andrias, supra note 9, at 1596; see also Richard Primus, Unbundling
Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1082 (2013); infra Part V.B.
16. See infra note 42 (NLRA); infra notes 162–64 (SSA); infra note 21 (FLSA).
17. See infra note 21.
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enactment in order to breathe new life into how legal scholars understand
their foundations and purpose. Along the way, I make several arguments.
First, I argue that the statutes are historically connected in part by the
overlapping social movements that were involved in their enactment.
Drawing on social movement theory, I argue that the statutes were produced
by a “wave of mobilization” characterized by overlapping and linked
movements struggling for worker security. Second, I argue that the statutes
are historically connected as responses to conditions of economic insecurity
for wage earners that the forces behind their enactment believed were
constitutionally impermissible. Third, I argue that the statutes are connected
at the level of theory because each seeks to redefine economic freedom for
workers around security and to tie security to citizenship. Fourth, I argue
that each statute has settled into the constitutional fabric and has become a
“small c” constitutional commitment.18 Finally, I argue that the statutes are
best understood as a set of connected “small c” constitutional commitments:
together, a “workers’ constitution.”
This Article proceeds in five Parts. In Part I, I lay the foundations for the
history that follows, foregrounding the economic context from which the
statutes arose and the wave of connected movements that pushed for their
enactment. In Parts II, III, and IV, I explore the rise and constitutional status
of, respectively, the NLRA, SSA, and FLSA. In Part V, I turn to considering
some implications of this historical recasting. In the Conclusion, I briefly
situate this Article in debates about today’s rising levels of economic
inequality produced in part by the withering and ossification of the workers’
constitution.19

18. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE
NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 29–74, 171–208 (2010) (assessing how “super-statutes,”
including the Social Security Act of 1935, have established “small-c” constitutional rights).
Jack Balkin refers to statutes that fulfil constitutional purposes as “constitutional
constructions.” See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 113–14, 300–10 (2011). Bruce
Ackerman, in his account of “constitutional moments,” also references “landmark statutes.”
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1742 (2007). I
argue that the statutes are “super-statutes” in Part V.B below, but they would also qualify as
constitutional constructions or landmark statutes.
19. See, e.g., GANESH SITARAMAN, THE CRISIS OF THE MIDDLE-CLASS CONSTITUTION:
WHY ECONOMIC INEQUALITY THREATENS OUR REPUBLIC (2017); K. Sabeel Rahman,
Domination, Democracy, and Constitutional Political Economy in the New Gilded Age:
Towards a Fourth Wave of Legal Realism?, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1329 (2016); Ganesh Sitaraman,
The Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
1445 (2016); see also Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 11, at 1290.
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I. NEW DEAL CONSTITUTIONALISM
Rather than taking on the incredibly generative New Deal writ large,20 or
analyzing its statutes one-by-one,21 in this Part I explore how a connected set
of movements and legislators sought to win new rights of economic security

20. Among legal scholars, Bruce Ackerman perhaps best epitomizes this approach.
Ackerman argues that through a multistep process—signaling, proposing, triggering,
ratifying, and consolidating—FDR gained the authority to speak on behalf of “We, the People”
in creating a federal government that would intervene in the economy. See 1 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS ch. 5 (1991); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS pt. III (1998). He references the NLRA and SSA as signature
achievements of the era, but he does not recount their histories. See 2 ACKERMAN, supra, at
391; Ackerman, supra note 18, at 1761. In some ways, this height becomes a disadvantage to
a bird’s-eye level approach and limits from view the richer histories of the New Deal.
Ackerman, for example, must explain policies as ranging as the Securities and Exchange Acts
of 1933, the NLRA, the Public Utility Holdings Act, the repudiation of the gold standard, and
so on. See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra, at 256–71.
21. Scholars have produced rich accounts of the history of the NLRA. See, e.g., Mark
Barenberg, Political Economy of the Wagner Act: Power, Symbol, and Workplace
Cooperation, 106 HARV. L. REV 1379, 1392–1410 (1993); William E. Forbath, The New Deal
Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 175 (2001); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth
Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional
Law, 1921–1959, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 59 (2002); see also WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND
THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT ch. 1 (1991) (providing an earlier history).
They have also produced rich accounts of the history of the SSA. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE &
FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 171–208. There is comparatively less focus on the FLSA in legal
scholarship. In a prominent recent exception, Kate Andrias explores the statute’s industry
committees and approach to social democracy. Kate Andrias, An American Approach to Social
Democracy: The Forgotten Promise of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 128 YALE L.J. 616
(2019). Other articles engaging with the statute include, for example, Samuel R. Bagenstos,
Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225, 263 (2013); Judith Resnik,
Vital State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts,
Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1780–87 (2017);
and Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685, 2687–91
(2008); as well as Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987); and Deborah C. Malamud,
Engineering the Middle Classes: Class Line-Drawing in New Deal Hours Legislation, 96
MICH. L. REV. 2212 (1998).
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for workers. This Article’s approach entails both a focus on the diverse
actors behind the statutes22 and the interconnections among them.23
A. The Transformation of the Economy
The forces behind the rise of the workers’ constitution responded in large
part to the transformation of the economy. The relatively agrarian economy
of the American founding had become with the Industrial Revolution an
economy where citizens were largely wage earners, often in large corporate
enterprises. This transformation was thought by many social movements and
political leaders to destabilize the constitutional system by creating vast
economic insecurity that would bleed into the political system.
For the founding generation, structuring the economy around agrarian
independence created the economic conditions for sustaining selfgovernment.24 Granting wide access to property was thought to create a
system of citizen-entrepreneurs—then, white males—whose economic selfsufficiency would make them the kinds of independent persons that could
govern themselves.25 This notion was not only linked to property enabling
citizens to become entrepreneurs or farmers from their own land, but also,
and equally importantly, to combating the docility and domination in webs
of landlord-tenant governance that would bleed into politics and make
constitutional self-government impracticable.26
But as the nation moved from an agrarian system to an industrial system
based on wage-earning in enterprises, the Industrial Revolution created the
very webs of dependence that property was meant to untangle. As the nation
22. In this way, it differs from approaches focusing largely on presidential leadership. See
1 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, ch. 5; 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, pt. III. See generally CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION—AND WHY WE
NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2006). Indeed, the focus on presidential leadership requires
scholars like Ackerman to focus on presidential elections as evidence of “mandates” reflecting
popular assent—a move that is criticized. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW
DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 27 (1998) (noting that “it
is difficult to see how the Court could have construed the 1936 election as a constitutional
referendum” in light of the fact that “Roosevelt assiduously avoided raising either the
Constitution or the Court as an issue in his campaign”); Michael J. Klarman, Constitutional
Fact/Constitutional Fiction: A Critique of Bruce Ackerman’s Theory of Constitutional
Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 771 (1992) (book review) (“Ackerman asserts that the 1936
election represented a popular mandate against the Court’s constriction of the New Deal.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of this thesis is that Roosevelt scarcely mentioned the
Court during the 1936 campaign.”).
23. Scholars who focus singularly on the NLRA or SSA do not account for the ways in
which certain New Deal achievements together responded to the problems industrialism posed
for workers. Scholars pluck the statutes out of their historical context and proceed with a
“view from nowhere” rather than a contextualized understanding of how statutes connect. Cf.
THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (contrasting an objective perspective,
detached from experience and reasoning about experiences from the outside—a “view from
nowhere”—with a subjective perspective based on personal experience and feeling).
24. E.g., Joseph Fishkin & William E. Forbath, The Anti-Oligarchy Constitution, 94 B.U.
L. REV. 669, 680 (2014).
25. ERIC FONER, THE STORY OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 9 (1999).
26. E.g., GORDON WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 106 (Vintage
Books ed. 1993) (1991).
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became a country of workers in often large enterprises, the notion of
economic freedom being embodied by atomistic and self-sufficient citizenentrepreneurs no longer fit economic conditions.27 In the Progressive Era
and through the Great Depression, economic life was coming to be seen by
many workers, movements, and political leaders as a sphere of vast
insecurity, where citizens were powerless in bargaining with employers over
their wages, hours, and working conditions,28 where child labor existed,29
where job loss or old age meant material insecurity,30 and where efforts of
workers to associate to challenge these conditions were thwarted by
employers and courts.31 Citizens needed to work to survive, and they had
very little control over their work lives and working conditions.32
For many citizens and political leaders, the consequences of this new form
of economic ordering had constitutional implications. Economic insecurity,
as movements and legislators argue again and again in the histories that
unfold below, made people unfit for citizenship in our constitutional
republic.33 Thus, with the rise of the Industrial Revolution came a new wave
27. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA, 1880–1960, at 33–36, 59–95
(1985). As Robert Dahl put it, “The older vision of a citizen body of free farmers among
whom an equality of resources seemed altogether possible, perhaps even inevitable, no longer
fitted that reality of the new economic order in which economic enterprises automatically
generated inequalities among citizens.” ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO ECONOMIC
DEMOCRACY 3 (1986).
28. See, e.g., GEORGE E. PAULSEN, A LIVING WAGE FOR THE FORGOTTEN MAN: THE QUEST
FOR FAIR LABOR STANDARDS 1933–1941, at 16–34 (1996) (exploring workers’ difficulties in
controlling wages and hours and in receiving legislative aid in doing so); LANDON R. Y.
STORRS, CIVILIZING CAPITALISM: THE NATIONAL CONSUMERS’ LEAGUE, WOMEN’S ACTIVISM,
AND LABOR STANDARDS IN THE NEW DEAL ERA ch. 1 (2000) (exploring the fight for minimum
wage and hour laws).
29. See, e.g., FLORENCE KELLEY, SOME ETHICAL GAINS THROUGH LEGISLATION ch. 1
(1910) (exploring the phenomenon of child labor in the United States).
30. See infra notes 165–68 and accompanying text.
31. See generally, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION
(1930).
32. See, e.g., IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE LEAN YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER, 1920–1933 chs. 1–2 (1960) (surveying the conditions in mill villages where workers
had very little power, were sometimes hired as families, worked incredibly long hours without
adequate pay, and lived on company grounds and often company credit). As William Forbath
explains, this situation had been produced by “increasing concentration of ownership of
resources and capital” during a time that would push “millions of working-class women and
children into the factories.” William E. Forbath, Caste, Class, and Equal Citizenship, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1999). The proprietors of these factories “demand[ed] longer and longer
hours of ‘mindless toil,’ that deprived working[ people] of the time to educate themselves and
participate in public affairs.” Id. at 29. The system produced “more ‘dependence,’ more
‘ignorance,’ and more ‘grinding poverty.’” Id.
33. The constitutional political economy argument tied economic freedom to citizenship
and therefore political freedom. See generally Fishkin & Forbath, supra note 11. Economic
freedom in this understanding helps to create the conditions for political freedom—that is, for
citizens to participate in self-government. See DAHL, supra note 27, at 1 (noting the American
consensus “that a well-ordered society would require . . . political liberty . . . and economic
liberty”); FONER, supra note 25, at 9 (noting that, since the American Revolution, it has been
axiomatic in American constitutional thought that political freedom and a decent measure of
economic freedom are both required).

2019]

THE WORKERS’ CONSTITUTION

1467

of movements that sought to win workers guarantees of security and to
redefine economic freedom for workers around security and tie economic
security to citizenship.34
B. A Wave of Mobilization
FDR’s election would be a turning point for workers’ movements. The
fall of 1932 commenced what social movement theorists call a “wave of
mobilization.”35 Waves occur when movements facing similar problems see
political openings and rise up together to capture political opportunities by
engaging with legislators and executive branch officials on multiple yet
related lawmaking fronts.36
In the fall of 1932, disparate movements connected and increased their
ambitions for a national program of economic security legislation. The
moment had the elements that social movement theorists associate with a
wave. First, the movements were responding to the political opening of
FDR’s election with new ambitions, and second, they were crossing lines to
come together to plan this ambitious agenda of connected worker-security
measures; in the statutory histories below, indeed, they continue to
intersect.37
The movements that gathered that fall would become among the leading
organizations behind the rise of the “workers’ constitution” in the years to
follow. In November of 1932, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) held
a blockbuster convention bringing disparate movements together to call for
34. This is not to deny the earlier lineage of workers’ movements. The labor movement,
for example, has rich history in American life preceding the Industrial Revolution. See
generally, e.g., TOMLINS, supra note 27, ch. 2.
35. By focusing on social movement theory and how movements guide constitutional law,
my approach is nested in “democratic constitutionalism” scholarship. See, e.g., Reva Siegel &
Robert Post, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L.
REV. 373, 374 (2007) (defining the term). Scholars of democratic constitutionalism focus on
how social movements and citizens “make claims about the Constitution’s meaning” and
engage with political figures to guide constitutional change. Id. Drawing on social movement
theory, democratic constitutionalists assess how movements frame constitutional struggles,
mobilize resources, and succeed or fail in influencing courts and other constitutional
interpreters based on structural political factors. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Constitutional
Change, Courts, and Social Movements, 111 MICH. L. REV. 877, 877–79 (2013) (reviewing
JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD
(2011)).
36. E.g., J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow, Farmworkers’ Movements in Changing
Political Contexts, in THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER: CASES AND CONCEPTS 287, 297 (Jeff
Goodwin & James M. Jasper eds., 3d ed. 2015); J. Craig Jenkins & Charles Perrow,
Insurgency of the Powerless: Farm Worker Movements (1946–1972), 42 AM. SOC. REV. 249
(1977) [hereinafter Jenkins & Perrow, Insurgency]. The idea of waves of mobilization has
Deweyian undertones: just as Dewey theorized that “publics” would form by bringing the
problems of everyday life to the state for collective resolution, social movement scholars show
how movements may overlap and converge in accessing the state. See generally JOHN DEWEY,
THE PUBLIC AND ITS PROBLEMS: AN ESSAY IN POLITICAL INQUIRY (1927).
37. For useful explanations of how political opportunities and movement interconnections
structure waves of mobilization, see generally Jeff Goodin & James M. Jasper, Introduction
to THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS READER: CASES AND CONCEPTS, supra note 36, at 3; and Jenkins
& Perrow, Insurgency, supra note 36.
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and draft sweeping federal labor legislation.38 The stirrings at the conference
would become the first sparks in the New Deal battle for the NLRA.
Similarly, that December, the American Association for Labor Legislation
(AALL) met in Cincinnati, bringing together labor-movement leaders,
leaders of several prominent worker movements, star lawyers like Felix
Frankfurter, and reformers like Frances Perkins.39 Fueled by “widespread
interest in social justice legislation” and stirred by FDR’s call for a “new
deal,” the AALL and the various movement representatives seized the
moment to plan for a program of social insurance legislation—a plan that
would lay the foundations for the SSA.40
The National Consumers’ League (the “League”) held a similarly wellattended conference that December, bringing together various movements
and intellectual leaders and calling for a dramatic federal program of
workers’ legislation: wage and hour laws, which were the League’s bread
and butter, but also unemployment and old-age insurance, collective
bargaining rights, and child labor prohibitions.41
These movements had long histories and pedigrees—the AFL had been
around since 1886, focusing on worker collective action; the AALL since
1905, fighting for social insurance programs of various kinds; and the League
since 1891, leading the fight for wage and hour laws and child labor
prohibitions. They had been working, both independently and together,
toward achieving victories for workers for sustained periods, making
piecemeal progress mostly at the state level, but this was a particularly
energetic moment both in terms of the movements’ ambitions at the federal
level and their interconnection.
In the following three Parts, I recreate the history of the New Deal wave
of mobilization that helped to produce the economic security statutes. I focus
in each Part on the development of a movement in response to the problems
posed by industrialism, sketching its formation and view of legislative rights
making, and then turn to the histories of the enactment of the statutes.
Although the movements in each history interact and overlap, the history of
the NLRA focuses principally on the AFL; the SSA, on the relationship
between an elderly movement, the Townsendites, and a group of mostly
Wisconsin-based academics, which I sometimes refer to as the
“Wisconsinites,” although they were a subset—indeed, the most powerful
part—of the AALL; and the FLSA, on the League and various parts of the
labor movement.

38. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 476, 481–82.
39. John B. Andrews, Annual Business Meeting, 23 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 60, 60–61
(1933).
40. John B. Andrews, Social Justice, 22 AM. LAB. LEGIS. REV. 115, 115 (1932).
41. LUCY RANDOLPH MASON, TO WIN THESE RIGHTS: A PERSONAL STORY OF THE CIO IN
THE SOUTH 12 (1952); STORRS, supra note 28, at 94.
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II. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1935
The NLRA, which would protect the right of workers to bargain
collectively, was born of a significant engagement between movements and
congressional leaders. This Part first explores the labor movement’s efforts
to define economic freedom around worker association and collective
security.42 It then explores how the AFL played a key role in teeing up
collective bargaining guarantees by getting them into a corporatist bill that
would be a precursor to the NLRA—the National Industrial Recovery Act
(the “Recovery Act”). The Part then turns to the battle for the NLRA. While
strands within the AFL remained unconvinced of or opposed to governmental
intervention along the lines of the NLRA, much of the AFL had come to
“firmly support[]”43 the bill by the time it was introduced. AFL leaders
influenced core components of the final shape of the legislation, and labormovement pressure helped pave the way for its enactment. Finally, this Part
also explores how congressional leaders, along with the labor movement,
came to define economic freedom around worker self-representation in
unions.
A. Movement Development
This Part focuses in large part on the AFL, which began to rise to
ascendance in the 1890s.44 While the labor movement had previously made
constitutional arguments against a system of “wage slavery” based on the
Thirteenth Amendment and other constitutional provisions,45 the AFL at the
time began to narrow the labor movement’s goals.46 The movement’s
ascendancy “reflected a shift toward the judgment that workers must frankly
accept their status as wage earners and seek higher wages and better working
conditions” through collective bargaining.47
As the AFL rose to prominence, concepts like “industrial freedom” and
“industrial democracy” became central parts of both progressive and labor
movement discourse.48 Indeed, Samuel Gompers, the AFL’s president from
42. The role of the labor movement in the lead-up to the enactment of the NLRA has been
explored by James Gray Pope. See Pope, supra note 21, at 59. This Part builds on his account
by exploring in detail labor’s influence in producing the Act and in generally establishing
collective bargaining as a federally protected norm as early as 1932. I diverge from Pope’s
account insofar as I do not think that Congress was as untrue to labor’s constitutional vision
as he does and agree with William Forbath’s account in this regard. See Forbath, supra note
21, at 175. I also diverge from scholars who focus on Wagner and Congress and not as much
on the labor movement in the NLRA’s construction. See generally Barenberg, supra note 21.
43. IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 89 (1950).
44. See TOMLINS, supra note 27, ch. 2.
45. See Forbath, supra note 32, at 18–23, 34–43; see also FONER, supra note 25, at 60;
WILLIAM E. FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT ch. 1
(1991).
46. See Forbath, supra note 32, at 59. The AFL’s rise coincided with the decline of the
Knights of Labor, which had organized workers across “skill, race, and ethnicity.” Id. at 58;
see also id. at 58–59 (discussing the AFL’s racial issues and shortcomings).
47. FONER, supra note 25, at 135.
48. Id. at 141.
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its inception through 1924, said that industrial freedom was founded upon “a
new concept of the rights of man”49 and the “right . . . to have a voice in the
industrial world.”50
AFL leaders contrasted worker economic freedom through association
with the ills of workplace domination and connected both to citizenship. As
Gompers declared, it was “ridiculous to imagine that wage-workers can be
slaves in employment yet achieve control at the polls.”51 AFL President
William Green, who would lead the movement from 1924 to 1952, similarly
argued that worker association contributed to self-independence and
citizenship.52 Labor leaders thus argued that political freedom was “not
sufficient unless the wage-earner possesses an industrial equality that places
him on a par with his employer[; until then,] there can never exist that
freedom and liberty of action which is necessary to the maintenance of a
republican form of government.”53 As future U.S. Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis summarized labor’s argument, citizens could not be “selfrespecting members of a democracy” without “freedom in things
industrial.”54 The possibility of “political liberty” was undermined by
“industrial slavery.”55 As a member of the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks
wrote in the AFL’s journal, “Mere political independence was a dead letter
unless it was accompanied by industrial independence.”56
Despite some promising advances in the Progressive Era—including the
passage of the Clayton Act of 1914, which declared that the “labor of a
human being is not a commodity,”57 and spurts of organizing soon after,
including the Era’s largest labor uprising in 1919–1920 with steel strikes

49. Samuel Gompers, President, AFL, Address to the AFL Convention at Horticulture
Hall in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (Nov. 9, 1914), in REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTYFOURTH ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 3 (1914).
50. See id. Much of this would come through direct confrontation with the courts that
were attempting to stand in the way of labor’s right to protest and strike. See generally, e.g.,
FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 31; TOMLINS, supra note 27, ch. 3; Forbath, supra note
32; Luke P. Norris, Labor and the Origins of Civil Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 462 (2017).
51. SAMUEL GOMPERS, LABOR AND THE COMMON WELFARE 125 (Arno Press, Inc. reprt.
ed. 1969) (1919).
52. Praise Carnegie at Founder’s Day Exercises, PITTSBURGH GAZETTE TIMES, Apr. 30,
1926, at 1. Green also argued that labor association would help workers reduce their hours so
that they could have the ability to participate in community activities. Id. A worker who has
time away from work, he continued, “becomes a social factor and his interest in civic and
political affairs is quickened and intensified.” Id. “He is a force in the community, a better
citizen and a more efficient workman,” one who has the energy to participate in constitutional
self-government. Id.
53. Editorial, 40 IRON MOLDERS’ J. 750, 750 (1904), quoted in Forbath, supra note 32, at
59.
54. FONER, supra note 25, at 142.
55. Id.
56. Henry F. Kirkham, Union Achievements, 38 AM. FEDERATIONIST 947, 948 (1931),
quoted in Forbath, supra note 32, at 59.
57. Clayton Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (2012)).

2019]

THE WORKERS’ CONSTITUTION

1471

which, at their height, included some 365,000 workers58—the labor
movement bled one million members during the 1920s and made few
advances.59 During that period, workers increasingly found their efforts to
protest and strike rebuffed by federal judges issuing injunctions that often
interpreted their activities as conspiratorial or violent.60 The NorrisLa Guardia Act of 1932, which cabined this judicial discretion and declared
in name a right of workers to associate,61 was a signature achievement
removing some impediments from the way of worker association. But the
legislation was opposed by President Hoover, who ultimately signed it but
sought to undermine it swiftly;62 a full collective bargaining right was not yet
entrenched by the beginning of the New Deal.
B. Passing the Statute
FDR had campaigned on a promise of leadership on the economy.
However, a national labor policy was not being developed by the incoming
president or Congress. Instead, the labor movement had assumed leadership
of the process. The AFL turned to Congress with a bill to limit the hours of
workers in interstate commerce. The bill was not a collective bargaining bill,
but the story of the deliberations around it and its ultimate failure are critical
to understanding how the NLRA would come to be. The compromise around
abandoning the bill would place a collective bargaining right at the center of
the national legislative agenda.
1. The Black Bill
At its November 1932 convention in Cincinnati, the AFL decided that the
Great Depression required a change in course from its position of opposing
wage and hour laws out of fear that they would provide wage floors and
ceilings. Its executive committee drafted a bill and convinced Senator Hugo
Black to introduce it in late December.63 The bill would limit hours and days
for those whose work was involved in interstate commerce. The United Mine
Workers (UMW) also proposed setting a minimum wage, although the wage
provisions never made it into the draft.64 During this period, the AFL and
UMW consulted with and worked with Senator Black and other legislators.

58. See FONER, supra note 25, at 176. For an overview of strikes during those years, see
also ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER,
1919–1933, at 41 (1957).
59. See FONER, supra note 25, at 179.
60. See, e.g., BERNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 391–93; FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note
31; Norris, supra note 50.
61. Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 101–115 (2012)).
62. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 414.
63. See IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE TURBULENT YEARS: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WORKER, 1933–1941, at 24 (2010).
64. See id.; see also Thirty-Hour Week Bill: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Labor,
73d Cong. 814 (1933).
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The House and Senate held hearings, and the AFL was the major supporter
of the bill, working behind the scenes to gain support from members of
Congress.65 The bill gained increasing popularity as it became clear that the
AFL was going to be a leading force in developing a recovery program for
workers. As one commentator wrote that February with regard to the labor
movement, “Any politician can testify . . . that this is not an influence to be
ignored safely.”66 The Black bill was thus becoming “the trigger of the
recovery program.”67 Another commentator asserted that the bill and the
activity surrounding it were a “revolution boiling up from the bottom.”68
On March 30, it was clear that the bill would pass at least the Senate and
potentially the House, although there were concerns among political leaders
about its constitutionality in light of the fact that it included limitations on
workers’ hours.69 The issue for FDR was that his administration was about
to “find itself with a recovery program without having taken a hand in its
formulation.”70 Indeed, it was a recovery program mostly created by the
AFL in coordination with other parts of the labor movement and
congressional leaders. FDR “had not yet seriously considered the problem
and did not know how he wanted to proceed.”71 He was “stung to action”
when the bill passed the Senate.72 FDR worried about a constitutional
showdown.73 And a showdown this would have been: the Black bill was a
direct challenge to the Supreme Court’s rulings about the unconstitutionality
of state wage and hour laws, and the Court had struck down many such
regulations as interfering with the Fourteenth Amendment’s protection of
liberty—here, the liberty of contract between employers and employees.74
The federal law implicated not only substantive due process concerns but
also the scope of Congress’s federal interstate Commerce Clause power.
Instead of creating fixed standards on wages and hours, the administration
proposed an alternative route suggested by Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins: it sought to create a scale of wages and hours keyed to certain
industries.75 The AFL indicated that it would support the bill if the bill would
also guarantee workers the right to bargain collectively.76 Many industry
leaders were deeply opposed to collective bargaining guarantees, but the

65.
66.
67.
68.

See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25–26.
Id. at 25 (quoting journalist Paul Anderson).
Id.
The commentator, Ernest K. Lindley, is quoted in ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE
AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 95 (1958).
69. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25.
70. Id. Perkins recounts, “When I talked with the President in April 1933 about the Black
bill, his mind was as innocent as a child’s of any such program as [the] NRA.” FRANCES
PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW 189 (1946).
71. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25.
72. WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL 56 (1963).
73. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25; SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 95.
74. See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
75. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 25–26. For a history of support of voluntary codes,
see SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 87–91.
76. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 26.
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AFL would not back down.77 Despite industry’s protest, the AFL was able
to negotiate with government leaders, and the House Labor Committee came
out in unanimous support of the bill, which included a collective bargaining
guarantee, “bowing fully to organized labor with respect to collective
bargaining.”78
Although the Black bill ultimately failed when the administration proposed
the Recovery Act instead, seeking to commit industries to voluntary codes
rather than national standards, the AFL had demonstrated its power and put
a collective bargaining guarantee on the table. To ensure the passage of the
Recovery Act in the Senate, FDR had asked Senator Robert Wagner to form
a committee to work on proposals.79 His committee and a drafting committee
worked to produce a flexible bill that involved self-regulation of business
under codes, which would be formed sector by sector and regulate workplace
issues from hours to wages to child labor.80 After Felix Frankfurter
recommended it, the committees also drafted the collective bargaining
guarantee that had been promised during the Black bill deliberations in light
of the “political strength of the AFL, as demonstrated by the Black bill.”81
In May 1933, FDR sent the Recovery Act to Congress.82 The debate in
Congress was focused on the collective bargaining right in section 7(a). The
AFL offered proposals to strengthen this provision by putting strong
language in favor not only of protecting collective bargaining as a “right” but
also of barring employer interference; the proposal was opposed by industry
leaders.83 Ultimately, the AFL prevailed: section 7(a) of the Act included a
strong collective bargaining guarantee.84 It gave workers “the right to
organize and bargain collectively” and prohibited employer interference with
that right.85 As labor historian Irving Bernstein puts it, “The American
Federation of Labor achieved in the Recovery Act, in one form or another,
its leading legislative demands. In addition to [section] 7(a), it won the
prospect of shorter hours through codes and collective bargaining, as well as
a public works program.”86 The New York Times reported that organized
labor “has suddenly jumped into . . . sudden power.”87 As Bernstein notes,
AFL President Green heralded section 7(a) as a “Magna Charta” for labor,
and John Lewis of the UMW “compared it with the Emancipation
Proclamation.”88

77.
78.
79.
80.

See id. at 26–27.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 27–30; see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 72, at 56–57.
See BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 27–30. For an overview of the drafting process, see
SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 96–98.
81. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 28–29.
82. See id. at 30–31.
83. See id. at 31–34.
84. See id.
85. Id. at 34.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting William Green and John Lewis).
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2. The Path to the NLRA
a. Trying the Path of Persuasion
The Recovery Act, and its assertion of workers’ right to bargain
collectively, created great energy among workers, who began joining unions
and organizing for labor rights.89 At the same time, the labor movement
helped push to get industries under codes through the Blue Eagle Campaign.
As historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., describes it, “Throughout the land
merchants put the Blue Eagle in their windows and stamped it on their
products” to show their support for the evolving labor regime and its sectorby-sector codes of conduct.90 The public engagement surrounding the
campaign was strong.91
Parades celebrated it. Speeches praised it. . . . Over two million employers
signed up. Consumers signed a pledge of their own . . . .
The climax came with the Blue Eagle parade in New York City . . . .
In the greatest march in the city’s history, a quarter of a million men and
women streamed down Fifth Avenue, while a million and a half more lined
the streets, watching and cheering.92

At the same time, the League—which had historically fought for wage and
hour laws and is at the center of the FLSA story in Part IV—connected with
the labor movement. League leaders were shocked by how little public
participation Hugh Johnson, the NRA administrator, brought to bear on
drafting codes. The League used public and intragovernmental channels to
pressure him and industries and, in so doing, is credited with influencing the
adoption of many labor codes.93 The “national surge around the Blue Eagle”
that the League and the labor movement had sparked “helped break the log
jam in Washington,” and “[d]raft codes began to pour in to NRA.”94
b. Strikes: Act I
There was a significant problem with the Recovery Act, however. The
collective bargaining guarantee in section 7(a) was being ignored. The words
of section 7(a) “expressed an intent,” “[b]ut they did not precisely define a
policy.”95 Put another way: “The meaning of 7a, in short, would be
determined in large part not by the words of the [Recovery Act] but by the

89. See id. at 35–37; SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 139. Unions gained incredible spikes
in membership, which contributed to the labor movement’s common appeal. See, e.g.,
LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 72, at 106–07.
90. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 115.
91. See id.
92. Id.; see id. at 111–15; see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 72, at 66.
93. See SUSAN WARE, BEYOND SUFFRAGE: WOMEN IN THE NEW DEAL 91 (1981); see also
STORRS, supra note 28, at 96, 110–12.
94. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 116.
95. Id. at 137; see also IRVING BERNSTEIN, THE NEW DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
POLICY 29–39 (1950).
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pressures management and labor could bring to bear on the process of
interpretation.”96 And so, as Schlesinger puts it:
[E]mployers were losing no time in mounting a counteroffensive. If the
Recovery Act promised workers the right to organize, the law still remained
vague about the form organization should take. Many businessmen decided
that the best way to meet the terms of the Act without unduly strengthening
labor was to set up company unions.97

Company unions were formed within a single plant or company.98
Workers in them could not join with a broader independent union. And union
leaders had the tricky position of working within the plant: “Men whose
future was dependent on the employer across the table obviously could not
put the labor case with the freedom of an outsider or with the technical skill
of a professional.”99 Because of this, the company union became “an ideal
instrument for any who sought to fulfill the letter and frustrate the spirit of
the Recovery Act.”100 This was a disappointment for the labor movement.101
The response to the problem was remarkable. Workers from across the
labor movement began to agitate and strike, and the “overriding issue in these
disputes was the fundamental right to bargain collectively. Workers formed
unions and demanded recognition.”102 From steelworkers to newspaper
workers, these strikes made national headlines and put wind in the sails of
the movement.103 As Bernstein recounts it, “Man-days lost due to strikes,
which had not exceeded 603,000 in any month in the first half of 1933,
spurted to 1,375,000 in July and to 2,378,000 in August.”104
The government, though, reacted with gradual measures, such as
establishing the National Labor Board (NLB) to deal with these disputes, but
it was then an ad hoc body without legal powers.105 It employed a commonlaw approach to interpreting section 7(a), and its “authority and prestige were
sapped in the latter part of 1933 by the fatal lack of a legal underpinning.”106
Workers began refusing to appear before it, and similarly ad hoc revisions
and changes were not sufficient.107 Strikes, sit-ins, and divisions within the
automotive industry across the country raised the stakes of the issue as
workers pushed for stronger guarantees of what they now considered in great
numbers to be a fundamental right.108 A wave of protest was peaking.

96. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 137.
97. Id. at 144.
98. Id. See generally 1 JAMES A. GROSS, THE MAKING OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD: A STUDY IN ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND THE LAW (1974).
99. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 144.
100. Id. at 145; see also TOMLINS, supra note 27, at 108–09.
101. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 145; see also TOMLINS, supra note 27, at 108–09.
102. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 173; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 144–45.
103. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 173.
104. Id. at 172–73.
105. Id. at 173–77.
106. Id. at 177.
107. Id. at 177–216; see also SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 148–49.
108. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 177–216; SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 385.
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c. NLRA: Attempt I
With the labor movement’s power at a seeming height, Senator Wagner,
his advisors and team of lawyers, and various movements worked together
to push for a stronger bill—one that would both guarantee workers the right
to bargain collectively and better respond to and prevent employer
interference.
As deliberations began, congressional leaders maintained that the NLRA
would enact new legislative rights of freedom. When introducing the bill,
Senator Wagner remarked, “Simple common sense tells us that a man does
not possess this freedom when he bargains with those who control his source
of livelihood.”109 He went on to argue that economic freedom could only be
ensured through the security of collective bargaining.110 Worker selfgovernment, the Senate report that came out of the committee hearings
declared, simply attempted to be true to “rights that were inherent in
citizenship,” including the right “to be free to form or join organizations, to
designate representatives, and to engage in concerted activities.”111
One marker of the power of the labor movement in the legislative
deliberations during 1934 was the extent to which members of Congress
recognized the pressure of the movement and felt compelled to respond. The
preamble to the 1934 bill itself reflected this reality. In one part it declared,
“Inadequate recognition of the right of employees to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing has been one of the causes of
strikes, lockouts, and similar manifestations of economic strife.”112 In a
speech by Wagner to promote the bill, he continued this theme by citing the
900,000 workers whose disputes came before the National Labor Board.113
An article by Senator Wagner printed in the New York Times in March 1934
and included in the Congressional Record continued this theme:
Men versed in the tenets of freedom become restive when not allowed to
be free. The sharp outbreaks . . . in various parts of the country at the
present time have been caused more by the failure of employers to observe
the spirit of section 7(a) of the Recovery Act than by any other single
factor.114

The AFL President, William Green, continued this siren call in his
testimony, where he recounted the efforts that workers had made in good
faith to organize, only to be thwarted by management.115 Just before the
Senate Committee on Labor issued its report, an automotive strike involving
100,000 workers was averted, but the Committee did not forget: its report
stated that during their deliberations, the strike had been narrowly averted
109. 78 CONG. REC. 4230 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
110. Id.
111. S. REP. NO. 73-1184, at 4 (1934).
112. S. 2926, 73d Cong. § 2 (1934).
113. 78 CONG. REC. 3678–79 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
114. 78 CONG. REC. 4230 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
115. S. REP. NO. 73-1184, at 69 (1934) (statement of William Green, President of the
American Federation of Labor).
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and that witnesses testified that “a majority” of the strikes were “caused by
interference with the right of individuals to organize.”116
On June 3, 1934, the chairman of the Senate Committee on Labor echoed
the power of the movement.117 But debate did not go on long in the Senate
before FDR proposed a substitute measure to keep the Recovery Act alive by
strengthening the NLB’s enforcement power through enabling it to hold
union elections.118 When Wagner took the floor, he agreed to support the
president’s measure, arguing that it “may be a good thing to allow these
reforms to encounter an additional period of trial and error, so that the
processes of education and understanding may catch up with the social
program that has been inaugurated.”119 Senator La Follette took a stronger
tone. He spoke of the “ominous signs of great unrest” in the country and
reminded his fellow senators that strikes “are in progress in practically every
section of the United States.”120 He urged that the bill be passed and the
president’s measure defeated. With these words in the air, the session closed
and the president’s measure was passed.
d. Strikes: Act II
A flood of strikes proceeded—together they were “the great wave of
strikes”121 of the “volcanic” summer of 1934.122 And the “right to organize
was itself becoming the crucial issue” throughout these strikes.123 As
Bernstein says, “In 1934 labor erupted.”124 “There were 1856 work
stoppages involving 1,470,000 workers, by far the highest count in both
categories in many years.”125 They included the “auto parts workers at the
Electric Auto-Lite Company in Toledo, . . . truck drivers in Minneapolis, . . .
longshoremen and then virtually the whole labor movement on the shores of
San Francisco Bay, and . . . cotton-textile workers in New England and the
South.”126 In order to push for the right of collective bargaining, there was
the “growing conviction of many workers that they must now take matters
into their own hands and demonstrate their collective power.”127
The strikes have been credited with having impact. As James Gray Pope
states, the “great strike wave of 1934 provided the impetus for the Wagner
Act and stiffened the Democrats’ determination to regulate the national

116. Id. at 11.
117. 78 CONG. REC. 10,351–53 (1934) (statement of Sen. Walsh).
118. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 150–51.
119. 78 CONG. REC. 12,018 (1934) (statement of Sen. Wagner); see also id. at 12,016–22,
12,024–34.
120. Id. at 12,027–28 (statement of Sen. La Follette).
121. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 185.
122. Id. at 216.
123. SCHLESINGER, supra note 68, at 385.
124. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 217.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 218.
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economy.”128 The strikes of the summer of 1934 died down by the time that
the NLRA was going to be reconsidered in the spring of 1935, but the labor
movement was sure to remind Congress and FDR of their nearness. Pope
describes the scene in detail, from John Lewis of the UMW ordering a
national strike of 400,000 coal miners on the night that the Recovery Act
expired, to the Philadelphia delegations from 400 unions preparing for a
wave of strikes to defend section 7(a), to even the New York Central Trades
and Labor Council raising “the spectre of a nationwide general strike.”129
The various parts of the movement, in short, were interconnected and
mobilized.
3. Debate and Passage
As the Senate again considered the NLRA, the labor movement took center
stage in legislative deliberations. As Bernstein explains:
[T]he bill was presented at the most favorable possible moment politically,
for 1935 was the apogee of the New Deal as a domestic reform movement.
The influence of labor was at its height and Senators who had little
enthusiasm for [the Act] feared to face the AFL at the polls with a negative
vote on their records.130

It is worth noting the movement convergence during these hearings as well.
Various parts of “the labor movement, industrial relations experts, [and]
religious leaders” testified in support of the bill.131 The Wisconsinites and
AALL—who are central to the social insurance battle discussed in Part III—
also strongly backed the bill, and Senator Wagner brought in Edwin Witte
and William Leiserson, two students of John Commons, a University of
Wisconsin professor who cofounded the AALL and created the Wisconsin
school approach to social insurance, to help his staff continue drafting the
bill.132
Labor’s argument about economic freedom was present in the hearings and
debates as well. In committee hearings, where the “great debate over the
Wagner Act took place,”133 Wagner spoke of bestowing upon the worker “a
new freedom to grapple with the great economic challenges of our times.”134
He also spoke of collective bargaining rights providing “emancipation from
economic slavery and of an opportunity to walk the streets free men in fact
as well as in name.”135 He continued this theme in his speech on the Senate
floor, calling the NLRA “the next step in the logical unfolding of man’s
eternal quest for freedom.”136 Aligning the NLRA with the American
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

James Gray Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L.J. 941, 942 (1997).
Pope, supra note 21, at 58.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 341.
Id. at 330.
See DELL P. CHAMPLIN & JANET T. KNOEDLER, THE INSTITUTIONALIST TRADITION IN
LABOR ECONOMICS 56–57 (2004).
133. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 330.
134. 79 CONG. REC. 2371 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
135. 79 CONG. REC. 6184 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
136. 79 CONG. REC. 7565 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
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Revolution, where political “despotism” was “cast off,” Wagner continued
that “today, with economic problems occupying the center of the stage, we
strive to liberate the common man from destitution, from insecurity, and from
human exploitation.”137 The “isolated worker” was “[c]aught in the labyrinth
of modern industrialism and dwarfed by the size of corporate enterprise,” and
he could “attain freedom and dignity only by cooperation with others of his
group.”138 The logic of the NLRA, as Wagner would put it in another
instance, was therefore not only to ensure worker economic freedom but to
protect our system of “democratic self-government” itself, for in an industrial
nation of workers, worker freedom of association made the “difference
between despotism and democracy.”139
Congressman Truax, a leader in the House, continued this theme and used
political concepts to anchor economic freedom. He said, to wide applause,
“Thomas Jefferson said: ‘If the Constitution is not right let us amend it.’ I
say that again that day has arrived.”140 He then called the NLRA a “new bill
of rights, a new declaration of independence, if you please.”141 He continued,
“[This] is an emancipation for American labor. As Lincoln freed the blacks
in the South, so the Wagner-Connery bill frees the industrial slaves of this
country from the further tyranny and oppression of their overlords of
wealth.”142
Senator Wagner also testified to the power of the labor movement.
Wagner referred to the recent strikes, and he also outlined how nearly threequarters of them were based on workers arguing in principle for the right to
bargain collectively.143 Wagner concluded that bolstering the right to
bargain collectively needed to be Congress’s path.144
The Senate Committee on Labor reported unanimously in the bill’s favor
on May 2, 1935, with the Senate report noting the labor movement’s activism
and power.145 Indeed, a few days before, the AFL had put together a
conference with over 400 representatives in attendance to support the bill, at
which Senator David Walsh, chairman of the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor, spoke.146 At the same time, the AFL remained in
contact with members of Congress and continued to negotiate on key items.
AFL President William Green testified in favor of the enactment of the
NLRA, and Wagner’s team of lawyers “constantly consulted [the AFL] and

137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Senator Robert F. Wagner, Address Before the National Democratic Club Forum
(May 8, 1937), quoted in Leon H. Keyserling, Why the Wagner Act?, in THE WAGNER ACT:
AFTER TEN YEARS 5, 13 (Louis G. Silverberg ed. 1945); see also Forbath, supra note 32, at
60–61.
140. 79 CONG. REC. 9714 (1935) (statement of Sen. Truax).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. S. REP. NO. 73-2926, at 8 (1934).
144. Id.
145. S. REP. NO. 74-573, at 2 (1935).
146. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 339.
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received many suggestions through its counsel, Charlton Ogburn.”147 The
AFL also pushed Frances Biddle, the chairman of the NLRB, to include a
provision in the bill stating employers’ duty to bargain “explicitly in view of
the pressing problem of union recognition under 7(a).”148
On May 15, 1935, Wagner took the bill to the floor. After short debate,
the bill passed the Senate the next day by a vote of 63-12. Only four
Democrats and eight Republicans voted against it. At the same time, FDR
consulted with labor leaders, including Green from the AFL, Hillman from
the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA), Lewis from the
UMW, as well as Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, and decided to support
the bill.149
Momentum was building for the passage of the bill when, on May 27, the
Supreme Court decided A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,150
which struck down title I of the Recovery Act.151 Wagner and his colleagues
were planning to replace the Recovery Act with the NLRA, but the ruling
increased doubts about the NLRA’s constitutionality. The Court found that
the portion of the Recovery Act at issue was unconstitutional because the
business activity in question only had an “indirect effect” on interstate
commerce.152 In moving forward, Wagner would distinguish the NLRA
from the Recovery Act. Wagner argued that the NLRA related to
“employment conditions related to goods that are intended for subsequent
interstate shipment or that are in the flow of commerce” and thus directly
FDR threw his support more
affected interstate commerce.153
wholeheartedly behind the measure, calling the Court’s decision a “horse and
buggy” view of interstate commerce and comparing the decision to Dred
Scott.154
The House proceeded with its deliberations, and the House report
reiterated the strength of the labor movement.155 Deliberation, too, continued
with unions. Senator Wagner addressed the Executive Council of the
Teamsters and assured them that the bill would not harm craft unions.156
Unresolved issues remained, and they demonstrate the movement
interlinkage and the movement interlinkage and conflict that can sometimes
occur. The AFL sided with Secretary Frances Perkins on housing the new
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) within the Department of Labor.157
The League worked strenuously to get the Act passed, but it thought that the
NLRB should be an independent agency and engaged in deliberations with

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 323; see also Pope, supra note 21, at 51–53.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 336.
Id. at 342–43.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
See generally id.
Id. at 548–49.
BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 344.
See 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 221 (1938).
79 CONG. REC. 7518 (1935) (statement of Rep. Connery).
BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 346.
Id. at 335.

2019]

THE WORKERS’ CONSTITUTION

1481

House leaders on this issue.158 The House ultimately adopted the League’s
position, and the Senate agreed.159 The Act passed the Senate easily on June
19, 1935, without a roll call, and passed the House on June 27 also without a
roll call.
The NLRA, among other things, provided workers the right to bargain
collectively and to engage in collective action for mutual aid and protection,
and indeed encouraged these features. It also set in place an administrative
structure—the NLRB—to enforce that right. Even those representatives who
worried about the constitutionality of the bill preferred to “gain labor’s
political support” and leave the outcome in the hands of the Supreme Court—
a fact that testifies to the power of the movement.160 FDR signed the Act
into law on July 5, 1935, giving pens to Senator Wagner and AFL President
Green.161
III. THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT OF 1935
This Part focuses on the role of a movement of mostly elderly citizens, the
Townsendites, and a group of academics, the Wisconsinites, who formed a
core part of the AALL,162 in pressuring for and drafting the Social Security
Act of 1935, which provided for federal unemployment insurance, old-age
insurance, and benefits for the blind, disabled, and dependent children. This
Part explores how they tied economic freedom to collective security through
social insurance, and then looks at their role in passing the legislation.
A caveat: Many groups were behind the push for social security during
the wave of mobilization, and many of them were integral to producing the
Social Security Act of 1935.163 Some accounts focus mostly on other groups,
and I reference them here.164 The Townsendites and the Wisconsinites,
however, had direct and cognizable roles in shaping the law that was
produced. The Townsend movement, although it favored old-age pensions
rather than social security, exerted enough external pressure to get old-age
guarantees onto the agenda and into a proposed congressional bill. At the
same time, because the administration and Congress were unsure of the final
form of a social security bill, they integrated members of the AALL, with the
Wisconsinites leading it, into an ad hoc committee that would propose
158. See STORRS, supra note 28, at 312 n.99.
159. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 348.
160. Id. at 341.
161. See id.
162. I focus on the Wisconsin members because of their outsize influence in forming the
AALL and pushing for social insurance as core members of the president’s Committee on
Economic Security. See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.2, III.B.4; see also THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL
POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: SOCIAL POSSIBILITIES IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 153 (1995)
(“The Social Security Act was basically a substantive and organizational victory for the
Wisconsin reformers . . . .”).
163. These include Abraham Epstein’s movement, John Andrews and his activism, the
work of the American Association for Old Age Security, and the Fraternal Order of the Eagles.
See, e.g., SKOCPOL, supra note 162, at 153. These movements were also critical of the initial
Act, as much as they propelled the energy for it. Id. at 174–77.
164. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 171–208 (focusing in large part on Epstein).
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architecture for the bill and draft major portions of it. The combination of
Townsendite pressure and Wisconsinite expertise would be key ingredients
in the making of the Social Security Act of 1935.
A. Movement Development
At the level of policy, the Townsendites and Wisconsinites would differ.
But each movement considered it to be a right for older Americans to have
security in their old age. This point became especially salient after the Great
Depression. The notion of an agricultural life, surrounded by family to take
care of one upon retirement, was fading.165 Just before the Great Depression,
Dr. Abraham Epstein estimated in 1928 that “30 per cent of the aged sixtyfive years and over were dependent on others for support.”166 With the Great
Depression, things worsened.167 In 1930, the dependent old-aged rose to 40
percent of those sixty-five and older and, by 1935, to 50 percent.168
1. The Wisconsinites and the AALL
John R. Commons, a founder of the AALL and the leader of its Wisconsin
school, was a student of Richard T. Ely at Johns Hopkins University and had
been influenced by him to study social insurance programs that would protect
injured and disabled workers, the unemployed, and the aged who could no
longer work.169 Commons began to advocate for these programs. He worked
with veterans, attempting to procure them pensions, and began to discuss the
need for pensions and other forms of social insurance with scholars and
workers’ movements.170
At Wisconsin, Commons began regular Friday evening conversations—
affectionately called “Friday Niters”—where he, students, and other
professors would discuss issues surrounding social security.171 Commons,
with his peers, turned to fighting in Wisconsin for compensation for
workplace injuries and deaths.172 He struck up a friendship with the more
conservative Yale professor Henry W. Farnam, and they united on issues
surrounding worker security.173 Commons, along with Farnam and Ely,
started the AALL—focusing on the right to unionize, on minimum wages,
and on worker security and insurance—with only twenty-three members,

165. See ABRAHAM HOLTZMAN, THE TOWNSEND MOVEMENT 20 (1963).
166. See id. at 22.
167. See id.
168. See id.; see also ROY LUBOVE, THE STRUGGLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY, 1900–1935, at
115–19 (1986).
169. See LUBOVE, supra note 168, at 115–19. See generally JOHN R. COMMONS, MYSELF
(1934).
170. See NANCY J. ALTMAN, THE BATTLE FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: FROM FDR’S VISION TO
BUSH’S GAMBLE 12 (2005).
171. See id. at 13.
172. See id. at 14.
173. See id. at 15; COMMONS, supra note 169, at 139.
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most of whom were friends of Commons.174 In a few years, it grew to over
3000 members, with leading lights such as Louis Brandeis and Jane Addams
on its roster.175
The Wisconsinites, through the AALL, campaigned for state legislation
for workers. It was auspicious that Commons would come to the University
of Wisconsin when progressive Robert La Follette became governor and
controlled both houses of the legislature.176 Commons and his colleagues
drafted and worked with legislators to put into law the nation’s first workers’
compensation law in 1911 in Wisconsin.177 It was upheld in the courts and
drew the attention of a young man, Arthur Altmeyer, then working in a small
law firm.178 Altmeyer enrolled in the University of Wisconsin and within
little time was integrated into the Friday Niters.179 He was joined by a young
Edwin Witte.180 Together with Commons and Farnam, they helped craft and
pass workers’ compensation statutes in thirty states by 1915.181 For years
after, they focused on state-provided health insurance, but to no avail.182 By
1920, Witte and Altmeyer were in Wisconsin state government, and the
AALL refocused its attention on unemployment and old-age security, with
little success.183
Together, in living rooms and in conferences, the Wisconsinites and the
AALL formed a vision of freedom based on collective security. As early as
1909, the proceedings of the AALL’s annual meeting show a merging of its
proposed legislation with fundamental constitutional commitments. A
transcription in the publication of its 1908 proceedings speaks of the
insecurity born of the losses incurred by both the workers—who lose their
lives or ability to work—and their families, who suffer as well.184 The
publication tied social insurance to liberty, saying that social insurance and
workers’ legislation would be in keeping with the “view of the founders of
the Republic,” who designed the Constitution to “secure the blessings of
liberty.”185
By the next year, the AALL’s journal spoke of the legislature as being
“bound to the observance of certain fundamental principles of individual
174. Its first formal gathering is summarized in the Proceedings of the First Annual
Meeting of the American Association for Labor Legislation, Madison, Wis., Dec. 30–31, 1907,
1 AM. ASS’N FOR LAB. LEGIS. (1908).
175. ALTMAN, supra note 170, at 15.
176. Richard T. Ely, Economy Theory and Labor Legislation, 1 AM. ASS’N FOR LAB. LEGIS.
10, 13 (1908).
177. See ALTMAN, supra note 170, at 15–16.
178. See Larry DeWitt, Never a Finished Thing: A Brief Biography of Arthur Joseph
Altmeyer—the Man FDR Called “Mr. Social Security,” SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. (1997),
https://www.ssa.gov/history/bioaja.html [https://perma.cc/HQ4T-N7T4].
179. See ALTMAN, supra note 170, at 16.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 17.
182. See id. at 17–18.
183. See id. at 19.
184. H. W. Farnam, Some Fundamental Distinctions in Labor Legislation, 2 AM. ASS’N
FOR LAB. LEGIS. 29, 42 (1908).
185. Id.
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right” to critique those courts which stand in the way of workers’
legislation.186 Later in the same volume, social legislation—including
collective bargaining guarantees, old-age insurance, workers’ compensation
insurance, and onward—was situated in its constitutional context: “Social
legislation” laid down a “new rule [that] must become a part of our
constitution.”187 The essay continued that the forms of social insurance and
protection sought were not only constitutional, but a “constitutional
necessity” to secure the purposes of the Constitution and make selfgovernment function.188 These forms were “positively constitutional,”
which means that “[t]hey both modernize and vitalize these honored phrases
and the constitution is given a new and larger life.”189 The essay concluded
by bringing the Wisconsinite vision full circle: “So a new meaning is given
to the constitution. The way is open for it to do for twentieth century
civilization what it has done for nineteenth century civilization.”190
2. The Townsendites
Years later, after the advent of the Great Depression, Dr. Frances E.
Townsend of Long Beach, California, was sixty-six years old when he was
forced into retirement without savings.191 He began to formulate an idea,
which appeared in its first form in the Long Beach Press-Telegram on
September 30, 1933, for the federal government to offer every person age
sixty or older a pension of $200 per month.192 This was a “princely sum in
the 1930’s.”193 Ever creative, Townsend also required that each recipient
spend the entire amount within thirty days.194
Within a few weeks of Townsend writing the letter, a full page of the
Telegram was dedicated to debate over the plan, and Townsend’s personal
residence was being stormed by neighbors wanting to discuss it.195 They
formed clubs in Long Beach and soon across the nation.196 The clubs had
regional and national conventions, which were a mixture of deliberation and
mass protest.197
From the beginning, the Townsend movement stressed the need for a
national system of old-age policy.198 The initial local petitions in California
called upon Congress to act, and the petitions thereafter frequently had their
186. See Ernst Freund, Constitutional Limitations and Labor Legislation, 3 AM. ASS’N FOR
LAB. LEGIS. 51, 58 (1909).
187. George G. Groat, Precedent Versus Conditions in Court Interpretation of Labor
Legislation, 3 AM. ASS’N FOR LAB. LEGIS. 88, 104–05 (1909).
188. Id. at 107.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. ALTMAN, supra note 170, at 27.
192. Id. at 27–28.
193. Id. at 28.
194. Id.
195. See HOLTZMAN, supra note 165, at 36.
196. Id. at 50.
197. Id. at 70.
198. See id. at 86–87.
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eyes set on the national stage.199 Equally important, the club’s membership
was largely composed of persons who had worked all of their lives and
viewed their right to a pension as emanating from that fact. These were
workers who could no longer work and who felt that their years of toil
entitled them to basic security.200
Within two years after the initial Townsend Club was chartered, there were
7000 clubs with approximately one and a half million participants.201
Already, in some congressional districts, not supporting the Townsend plan
meant defeat.202 When a Townsend bill was introduced in the House in 1934,
nearly two hundred congressmen absented from the vote.203
The right to old-age security was for Townsendites something
fundamental, something any “aging citizen should be entitled to.”204 And
this is why they brought their message about old-age security as a “right.”205
The Townsendites felt that the stakes could not be higher. Indeed, the
movement believed that the persistence of democratic government itself was
at stake: “We truly believe that if such a vigorous fight is not prosecuted
with all seriousness and resistance, we may expect to see our democratic form
of government pass; not only from this country but from the face of the earth
during this generation.”206 Economic security was, for them, imperative for
a thriving democracy.
B. Passing the Statute
During the New Deal, both movements knew that influence would have to
run through the national lawmaking process, and the lawmaking process was
not exactly trending in either movement’s direction as much as they had
hoped with FDR’s election. FDR supported old-age insurance and had
agreed before his inauguration to explore methods for establishing it, often
gesturing toward state or federal-state programs.207 And he had intended to
support such programs even earlier.208 But little was forthcoming. The
Wagner-Lewis bill of 1934, which FDR encouraged, dealt only with
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unemployment insurance. As one historian puts it, “Apparently the President
had not contemplated asking for old-age insurance at that time.”209
1. The Push for Old-Age Security
But 1934 was an election year for Congress, and the Townsend movement
was employing pressure.210 Signatures on petitions for old-age security
“mounted by the hundreds of thousands.”211 The press reported the
movement’s membership to be as few as 300,000 people and as many as
4,000,000.212 The Townsend clubs bombarded newspapers, senators, and the
White House with “carloads of letters.”213
As a result, Frances Perkins remarked that adding old-age insurance to the
Wagner-Lewis bill became “politically almost essential.”214 Perkins
continued, years later in her memoir, “One hardly realizes nowadays how
strong was the sentiment in favor of the Townsend Plan . . . . The pressure
from its advocates was intense.”215 She added that, as a result, FDR “began
telling people he was in favor of adding old-age insurance clauses to the bill
and putting it through as one program.”216
2. The Wisconsinites in Government
FDR composed the Committee on Economic Security (CES) in 1934 to
look into drafting a better bill in large part to respond to the Townsend
movement’s pressure.217 FDR also did so to be responsive to the wave of
mobilization around the issue of social insurance more generally, including
Senator Huey Long’s “share the wealth” movement and other social
insurance organizations such as the American Association for Social
Security.218 FDR wanted a proposal for a bill from the CES by January, five
months after he signed the executive order creating it, and a draft plan for it
by December 1. And here is where the story of the two movements
converges: the Townsendites levied the pressure that helped to create the
CES, and the Wisconsinites were integrated into the CES as a result of their
expertise and in the CES would play a leading role in the deliberations to
devise the architecture of social security. In this way, the Townsendites
received formal recognition as voices for the old-aged, while the AALL and
Wisconsinites were recognized for their expertise in designing social
insurance systems.
209. HOLTZMAN, supra note 165, at 87.
210. See id.
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217. See JILL QUADAGNO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY 108 (1988); see
also ALTMAN, supra note 170, at 28–29; HOLTZMAN, supra note 165, at 87.
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Labor Secretary Perkins brought in members of the AALL, and the
Wisconsinites took center stage. First, she brought in Altmeyer to implement
the executive order, and Altmeyer brought in Witte to serve as executive
director.219 As a research assistant, Witte brought in Wilbur Cohen, a student
of Witte’s and another regular Friday Niter.220 They also brought in Barbara
Armstrong, the first female law professor in the United States, who had
written a comparative global treatise on social security and insurance
programs.221 She had also been involved with various social security
movements and had developed social insurance policies in California and
other areas of the United States.222 The advisory council, apart from the staff
members, included members of the labor movement, various worker security
movements, as well as participants from industry.223
3. Townsendite Pressure
The wave of connected movements knocking at the door of the CES
continued to swell. The president had provided for an additional advisory
council of five, but there were over 150 experts that the White House thought
ought to be included in deliberations.224 As a result, they convened a national
conference and invited well over a hundred of these experts and activists.
The keynote speakers were an antipoverty activist doctor, Isaac Rubinow,
and Abraham Epstein, who led the American Association for Social
Security.225 Witte and Armstrong were asked by Perkins to write an initial
report outlining “the problem” for the CES in advance of the conference.226
Witte was sensitive to FDR’s hesitancy about old-age insurance and thus
focused more on unemployment insurance.227 To test the waters at the
conference, and in response to concerns over the constitutionality of old-age
insurance, FDR decided not to make it a centerpiece of the conference.228
Next, the Townsend movement came back into play in an important way.
As the conference was starting at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, D.C.,
FDR retreated on old-age insurance. Mentions of it were gone in the list of
discussion topics in the program and an address from FDR at the White
House that day yielded this message: “On some points it is possible to be
definite. Unemployment insurance will be in the program . . . . I do not
know whether this is the time for any Federal legislation on old-age
security.”229
219. See ALTMAN, supra note 170, at 35.
220. See id. at 38–39.
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Once again, the Townsend movement rose to action. “[They] reacted
immediately and vociferously. Letters, phone calls, and telegrams poured
into the White House.”230 Before long Perkins was on the phone with FDR,
who had left to vacation in Warm Springs, to explain the pressure being
levied by the Townsendites. FDR bent and asked Perkins to issue a press
release affirming the president’s strong support for old-age insurance.231
To further assuage the Townsendites, FDR gave a written address days
later to the National Conference of Mayors in which he strongly asserted that
old-age insurance would be included in his recommendations to Congress.232
Thus, as FDR moved back, the Townsend movement pushed him, and
ultimately old-age insurance, forward. The “urgency of the issue, reflected
in the election of Townsend congressmen and the mounting public demand
which the Townsend Plan spearheaded, could not be ignored.”233 In
addressing the CES after the conference, FDR thus said this of old-age
insurance:
We have to have it . . . . The Congress can’t stand the pressure of the
Townsend Plan unless we have a real old-age insurance system, nor can I
face the country without having devised at this time . . . a solid plan which
will give some assurance to old people of systematic assistance upon
retirement.234

4. Debate and Passage
The ball was back in the CES’s court. With a clear consensus around
making old-age and unemployment insurance part of the bill, it was a
question of how to do it and how to pass it.235 This was what the
Wisconsinites in the CES toiled over. Numerous proposals were floated for
programs, and numerous interpretations about the costs and benefits were
swirling around.236 Information overload set in and it was not long before
the president’s December 1 deadline passed and the CES had not come to
make its recommendation.237 Perkins ordered the CES to stay over
Christmas week to hammer out a proposal.238
A federal plan to provide a tax-offset scheme to states for unemployment
was led by Witte, with support from Perkins and Roosevelt.239 Witte also
pushed for a contributory plan for old-age insurance, a more federally led
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The Wisconsinites also
program than unemployment insurance.240
supported programs for the elderly in need, dependent children, and the
blind.241 And Grace Abbott, a former League and AALL member who now
ran the Children’s Bureau, had an outsize role in designing programs for
dependent children, and according to Witte, later played a critical role in
convincing the Ways and Means Committee to push forward with the bill
when its members were wavering.242 In these ways, the League and AALL
were in constant negotiation with lawmakers. Even the AFL “did everything
it could” to help pass the SSA.243
The CES turned these recommendations over to Congress, with no
knowledge of their fate. Concessions were made, including the removal of
agricultural and domestic workers from old-age and unemployment
insurance systems, a compromise made for senators from the South and to
the detriment of many working blacks and women.244 This would be a
limitation of the bill for some time.245 Apart from this limit, the bill was “in
its general design, consistent with the work that had emerged from the
Committee on Economic Security.”246 The Act both provided federal grants
to states that gave relief to the unemployed, needy, and to children, and
mandated payroll taxes for employers and employees to provide insurance
for unemployment and old age.
In the short legislative deliberations in 1935, Congress picked up on the
argument made by the movements, touting social insurance as both a right
and as fostering economic freedom through providing security. Sounding in
the Wisconsinites’ register, Senator Wagner, one of the sponsors in the
Senate, called social security a matter of right and heralded in a “new era of
well being in which the social inequalities of the past will be driven forever
from the scene.”247 Senator Alben Barkley also conceived of social security
as a fundamental right, and sounding in the Townsendites’ register, argued
that it stemmed from government’s “duty . . . to its aged and to its
unemployed and to its indigent.”248

240. See Orloff, supra note 207, at 73.
241. See id.
242. Witte stated that Abbott “above everyone else, was responsible for the child welfare
provisions which occur in the Social Security Act.” Letter from Edwin E. Witte to Edith
Abbott (Oct. 18, 1939) (on file with the University of Chicago library), quoted in Lela B.
Costin, Grace Abbott of Nebraska, 56 NEB. HIST. 164, 187 (1975). Witte also recounts how
the Ways and Means Committee was “very near . . . to ditching the entire bill” and how Abbott
took the lead in organizing a committee to pressure Congress, and in light of this gave Abbott
“much of the credit for getting this measure through Congress when it appeared to be lost.”
Id.
243. See ALTMEYER, supra note 207, at 32–33.
244. For a general summary of the racial and gender exclusions of New Deal programs, see
IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013).
245. See infra Part V.B for an overview of how the Act’s coverage was expanded over
time.
246. ALTMAN, supra note 170, at 79.
247. 79 CONG. REC. 9283 (1935) (statement of Sen. Wagner).
248. 79 CONG. REC. 9627 (1935) (statement of Sen. Barkley).
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Senator Nathan Bachman spoke of social security in promoting the
“economic independence” of citizens, which in turn allows the citizen to be
an “agent for his Government.”249 He continued that “American democracy
can be preserved only” by ensuring this kind of economic security.250
Similarly, Congressman Robert Doughton stated that Congress was
“fashioning the foundation stones upon which will rest the happiness and
welfare of future generations” by enacting “social reforms that are necessary
to preserve our economic and political institutions.”251 And Congressman J.
William Ditter spoke of the constitutional responsibility to protect the
“economic security” of citizens and stated that he was “persuaded that the
recognition of this responsibility by the civic and industrial leaders will help
to protect our traditional American institutions of freedom and personal
liberty by the correlation of the needed economic security.”252 Congressman
William Sirovich further argued that only after economic security is achieved
can one turn to being a citizen.253
The House passed the bill on April 19, 1935, by a vote of 372-33. The
Senate passed the bill by a vote of 77-9 on June 19, and conference proceeded
through July, with voice votes on August 8 in the House and August 9 in the
Senate. FDR signed the bill on August 14 and provided a pen to a leader of
the Fraternal Order of the Eagles, a gesture to the fact that even conservative
organizations and movements supported the Act.
C. FDR and the Supreme Court Weigh In
As FDR campaigned for reelection in 1936, which he would win in a
landslide, he focused on economic security. FDR’s acceptance speech for
the Democratic Party’s nomination took place in Philadelphia. Over 100,000
people gathered to hear a speech that Senator Wagner had helped to draft. In
the speech, FDR argued that “political freedom” must also extend to prohibit
“economic slavery,” that the “right to work” was no less central to citizenship
than “the right to vote,” and that the very liberty of democracy is not safe
otherwise.254
FDR continued, “For too many of us the political equality we once had
won was meaningless in the face of economic inequality. . . . For too many
of us life was no longer free; liberty no longer real; men could no longer
follow the pursuit of happiness.”255 He proclaimed, “Today we stand
249. 79 CONG. REC. 8224 (1935) (statement of Sen. Bachman).
250. Id.
251. 79 CONG. REC. 5476–77 (1935) (statement of Rep. Doughton).
252. 79 CONG. REC. 6092 (1935) (statement of Rep. Ditter). Although Ditter worried about
the constitutionality of the old-age security provisions of the Act, he ultimately voted for it.
See id. at 6091–92.
253. 79 CONG. REC. 5787 (1935) (statement of Rep. Sirovich) (“It is only after these
necessities are satisfied that an individual can turn his thoughts to problems of politics, society,
education, science, art, philosophy, or even religion.”).
254. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance of the Renomination for the Presidency (June 27,
1936), in 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 230–31, 233–34
(1936).
255. Id. at 233.
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committed to the proposition that freedom is no half-and-half affair. If the
average citizen is guaranteed equal opportunity in the polling place, he must
have equal opportunity in the market place.”256 As he put the argument in
an address on Labor Day, “The Fourth of July commemorates our political
freedom—a freedom which without economic freedom is meaningless
indeed. Labor Day symbolizes our determination to achieve an economic
freedom for the average man which will give his political freedom reality.”257
After the election, in 1937, the Supreme Court would have the opportunity
to weigh the constitutionality of the statutes. In each case, the Court
described workers and their insecurity as the national government’s focus,
which reflected the shift in emphasis from employer-employee freedom of
contract that had animated its substantive due process cases. In upholding
the NLRA on interstate commerce grounds in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.,258 the Court referred to workers’ “fundamental right” to “selforganization.”259 The Court focused on the conditions faced by workers that
made this right necessary, noting that workers were often “helpless in dealing
with . . . employer[s]” and that employees relied on wages to maintain their
lives and their families—all of which made it “essential to give laborers
opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer.”260 In another sign
of movement convergence, the Wisconsinites played a role in the case. After
the NLRA was passed, Wagner called in David Saposs, another former
Commons student and Wisconsinite AALL member, to develop evidence on
how labor issues and strikes affected interstate commerce.261 Finally, in
upholding the taxation and old-age insurance provisions of the SSA in
Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis262 and Helvering v. Davis263 on,
respectively, interstate commerce grounds and general welfare grounds,264
the Court spoke of the insecurity born of the problems of unemployment and
poverty, the inability of states to provide adequate relief, and Congress’s
judgment of the necessity of acting in favor of the general welfare to address
a national problem.265
IV. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT OF 1938
This Part explores the enactment of the FLSA, which, for workers in
interstate commerce, provided for a federal minimum wage, instituted
overtime pay requirements, and prohibited child labor, among other things.
256. Id. at 234.
257. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat 8: On Farmers and Laborers (Sept. 6, 1936),
http://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-6-1936-fireside-chat8-farmers-and-laborers [https://perma.cc/PWR3-W9WX].
258. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
259. Id. at 33.
260. Id.
261. See CHAMPLIN & KNOEDLER, supra note 132, at 57.
262. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
263. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
264. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . provide for the
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”).
265. See Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640–45; Steward, 301 U.S. at 585–90.
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The Part focuses first on the League. It explores the League’s arguments
about economic freedom and shows how it was integral to the generation of
a national conversation on wages and hours. It then explores the campaign
of pressure that the League launched to get the Act out of the House Rules
Committee, which had been holding it hostage for months. Throughout these
efforts, the League worked with and linked to other movements. The League
also integrated members into government, where they played important roles.
This Part focuses, finally, on the labor movement and traces its influence on
the evolution and passage of the FLSA.
A. Movement Development
Before becoming Secretary of Labor, Frances Perkins had long been
committed to workers’ rights and safety. As an employee of the League in
the early days of the twentieth century, Perkins demanded legislative action
after a fire at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory in New York City in 1911,
where 150 young girls died, “suffocating . . . behind locked doors, or leaping,
screaming, to the streets below.”266 When the New York State Legislature
set up an investigatory committee and put her on it, she took political leaders
to see young girls “up at dawn . . . snipping beans and shelling peas” at other
factories and alerted the leaders to the length of their hours, the paucity of
their wages, and the dangerousness of their conditions.267 Perkins and the
League believed that collective bargaining was not enough alone to prevent
these problems.268 As Schlesinger notes, “It was from these middle-class
groups . . . that the first demand came for the abolition of child labor, for
maximum-hour and minimum-wage laws, and for social insurance.”269 They
brought to their representatives, said Senator Wagner, “the insistent problems
of modern-day life.”270
Though the League formed in New York City in 1891 as the Consumers’
League, it became the National Consumers’ League in 1899.271 From then
through 1932, it was led by Florence Kelley. In discussing the work of the
League, Kelley liked to tell others what her father had told her: “My
generation has created industry, your generation must humanize it.”272 The
League’s motto was: “Investigation, education and legislation.”273 By 1916,
the League claimed to have 15,000 members in forty-three states.274 It
included on its rosters figures from Louis Brandeis to Eleanor Roosevelt.275
As the League’s General Secretary until Lucy Mason took over upon her
266. SCHLESINGER, supra note 58, at 96.
267. Id.
268. See id. at 25.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. See STORRS, supra note 28, at 23.
272. Id. at 12.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 23.
275. See Clement E. Vose, The National Consumers’ League and the Brandeis Brief,
1 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 267, 267–69 (1957).
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death, “Kelley masterminded the movement that by 1917 produced
maximum hours laws for women in most states and minimum wage laws for
women in a dozen states.”276
Like all of the movements explored here, the League believed that it was
fighting for fundamental rights for workers. They spoke, when opposing
child labor, of “the right to childhood.”277 Florence Kelley wrote that the
“right follows from the existence of the Republic”278 because children who
enjoy childhood rather than the doldrums of work become “enlightened selfgoverning citizens.”279 In arguing for shorter working hours and sufficient
wages, Kelley said that without leisure, limits on hours, and living wages,
“manhood becomes ignoble and unworthy of citizenship in the Republic.”280
The right to leisure, then, “is required to undo the damage wrought in the
working-hours, if the worker is to remain fit for citizenship in the
Republic.”281 Thus, the League came to believe that “equal rights in
citizenship” in the political sphere were “meaningless” without “social and
economic freedom.”282 Wage and hour laws and those banning child labor
were rights in “process of recognition” through the legislative process.283
B. Passing the Statute
The League’s membership declined during the 1920s, when policymakers
and presidents fostered an increasingly hostile environment to wage and hour
laws,284 but would resurge in the 1930s when it pushed harder for wage and
hour laws and put together large conferences of experts to discuss their
formulation.285 Quite a few members—including Frances Perkins, Eleanor
Roosevelt, and Grace Abbott—were integrated into inner echelons of state
and national politics by the 1930s.286 Among the movements considered
here, the League had the highest degree of inclusion within government
structures. And agitation by the League had helped to produce some of the
institutional configurations within federal government that would be
essential to the future success of workers’ rights: the Children’s Bureau in

276. STORRS, supra note 28, at 24.
277. KELLEY, supra note 29, at 3.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 108.
281. Id. at 109.
282. VIVIEN HART, BOUND BY OUR CONSTITUTION: WOMEN, WORKERS, AND THE MINIMUM
WAGE 114 (1994).
283. KELLEY, supra note 29, at 168.
284. See STORRS, supra note 28, at 17–18.
285. See id. at 22–23. See generally Lizabeth Cohen, The New Deal State and the Making
of Citizen Consumers, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN CONSUMER
SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 111 (Susan Strasser, Charles McGovern & Matthias
Judt eds., 1998).
286. STORRS, supra note 28, at 34–35.
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1912, the Women’s Bureau in 1920, and the Division of Labor Standards in
1934.287
1. New Deal Networks
By 1932, Florence Kelley had passed away, and Lucy Mason took the
helm of the League.288 The League began lobbying the Senate for hearings
on a potential bill and authorized Molly Dewson, who was close to FDR and
Eleanor Roosevelt, to explore with them routes to national legislation on
wages and hours.289 In these early processes of deliberation and consultation,
the League and its allies harnessed the citizens involved from their state
struggles to fight for a national policy. Indeed, while the Recovery Act was
still in its “gestational stage, Secretary of Labor Perkins proposed a national
wage-hour law based directly on the [League]’s model state bill.”290
At the same time, the League strengthened its networks, which would
become important to its success in the years ahead. It “drew on local
women’s groups, female-employing unions, settlement houses, church
groups, and labor departments” and was “behind the passage of six minimum
wage laws for women in 1933.”291 During this time, the League would also
shape labor leaders who would later be important to generating the FLSA.
John Lewis, who would later lead the Congress of Industrial Organizations
(CIO), which split away from the AFL at the end of 1935, and Sidney
Hillman, who would lead the ACWA, were influenced by the League to take
positions in favor of national wage and hour laws when the labor movement
was still largely skeptical of such government policies.292 Hillman had been
mentored by Frances Perkins and promoted by her when he worked in New
York State government, and Lewis had been influenced by League member
Josephine Roche, who owned a coal-mining company that had treated
Lewis’s union well.293 These leaders’ experiences with the League have
been credited with shaping their evolution toward supporting national wage
and hour legislation.294
2. The Path to the FLSA
A national policy would be difficult to enact. Court rulings striking down
wage and hour laws on freedom-of-contract grounds continued, although
287. See id. at 39. See generally ROBYN MUNCY, CREATING A FEMALE DOMINION IN
AMERICAN REFORM, 1890–1935 (1991); Josephine Goldmark, Fifty Years—the National
Consumers’ League, 85 SURVEY 674 (1949).
288. MASON, supra note 41, at 11–12.
289. See id. at 13–16.
290. STORRS, supra note 28, at 94.
291. Id. Connecticut, New York, Ohio, New Jersey, Illinois, New Hampshire, and Utah
were the first states to pass wage laws based on the League’s model bill. See, e.g., Alice S.
Cheyney, The Course of Minimum Wage Legislation in the United States, 38 INT’L LAB. REV.
26, 31 n.1 (1938).
292. See STORRS, supra note 28, at 100–01.
293. See id.
294. See id.; WARE, supra note 93, at 89.
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they were increasingly unpopular. By 1936, when the Court overturned yet
another minimum wage law on freedom-of-contract grounds in Morehead v.
New York ex rel. Tipaldo,295 “it alienated nearly everybody.”296 As
Schlesigner notes, “It was even too much for Herbert Hoover.”297
The Court would change direction not long after. The institution of these
standards was vindicated in the 1937 case West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,298
which upheld a 1913 Washington State minimum wage law for women.299
Chief Justice Charles Hughes, writing for the majority, defended the
minimum wage as protecting the liberty guaranteed by the Constitution, a
“liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the health, safety, morals and welfare of the
people.”300 The Court’s ruling in Parrish, as well as its upholding of the
Wagner Act and Social Security Act, also gave the movement hope in
national policy. After Parrish, at FDR’s prodding, Frances Perkins asked
administration lawyer Ben Cohen to turn his attention to the wage and hour
bill that she had “locked away in a desk drawer.”301 The bill he worked on
was based on a bill he had drafted before with the League, and he put his
energy into reworking it.302
As the bill was introduced in Congress on May 24, 1937, President
Roosevelt sent a letter imploring members of Congress to think of the
relationship between democracy and economic security—the one he had laid
out clearly as he campaigned for reelection in 1936. FDR stated that a third
of the nation was “ill-nourished, ill-clad and ill-housed” and that a “selfsupporting and self-respecting democracy can plead no justification for the
existence of child labor, no economic reason for chiseling workers’ wages or
stretching workers’ hours.”303
a. Courting Labor
In the meantime, in mid-May 1937, FDR turned his attention to
deliberating and negotiating with labor leaders. The AFL had been a leading
force at the outset of the New Deal in producing the Black thirty-hour bill.
Many forces within the labor movement had by then come around to national
regulation on hours. However, the AFL still worried that minimum wages
would become maximum wages, and while its leadership still supported
some type of wage program, it was not predisposed to put too much power
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ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 209, 210–11 (1938).
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in a federal administrative structure.304 AFL leaders wanted to ensure that
the form of the law did not undermine its purposes and even sought to exempt
unionized workplaces from legislation.305
Others were less concerned. John Lewis of the CIO was much more
supportive of the measures that were forthcoming.306 Hillman, president of
the ACWA, was also supportive of the measures and had worked with
Perkins in drafting similar legislation at the state level. Given labor’s
splintering, FDR called in the president of the AFL, William Green,
separately from Hillman and Lewis.307 With each, he discussed his hopes
for the labor standards bill. They were all supportive of a program to some
degree, but the details of that program were yet to be hammered out.308
b. Getting Child Labor into the Act
Cohen and other lawyers worked hard on the bill. An early draft was
produced without child labor prohibitions. Before the bill was sent to
Congress, it was a League member and former chief of the Children’s Bureau
(which, as noted above, was put in place in large part due to the League’s
efforts309) who consulted with government officials and also ensured that the
child labor provisions were put into the Act. As Frances Perkins recounted
the episode:
One last minute change was the insertion of a clause prohibiting the labor
of youngsters under sixteen in industries engaged in interstate commerce
or affecting interstate commerce, and providing for not more than eight
hours of work a day for children over sixteen. As Grace Abbott, [former]
Chief of the Children’s Bureau, so eloquently pleaded, “You are hoping
that you have found a way around the Supreme Court. If you have, why
not give children the benefit by attaching a child labor clause to this bill?”
The President readily agreed and was delighted that we might make this
bill cover child labor as well as low wages and long hours.310

Abbott had been integrated into government as a result of her work with the
League, and although she had retired from government in 1934, she was
instrumental in making sure that one of the League’s central commitments
made it into the bill.
c. Getting the Act out of Committee
When the now-polished bill based on the League’s model made it to
Congress, the League, now led by Mary Dublin, mobilized people across the
country and lobbied broadly in D.C. The labor movement, though, would
304. See PERKINS, supra note 70, at 258.
305. See id.
306. See Howard D. Samuel, Troubled Passage: The Labor Movement and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Dec. 2000, at 32, 33–34.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 34–35.
309. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
310. PERKINS, supra note 70, at 257.
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initially not be so enthusiastic. When the bill first came before Congress, the
testimonies of Lewis, Hillman, and Green were mixed.311 They continued to
support the bill in principle but all testified in favor of amendments that, to
their minds, would best realize the aims of the bill by ensuring that minimum
wages did not become both floors and ceilings, among other things.312
The bill left committee, and after some back-and-forth and a few months
of recess, a version of the bill was able to pass the Senate, only to linger in
the House. Southern conservatives on the House Rules Committee held up
the bill, refusing to release it to the floor.313 While the bill floundered there,
the AFL amped up its criticism and the House Labor Committee proposed
another bill.314 By the spring of 1938, the House Rules Committee was still
stonewalling the bill.315
To put pressure on the Rules Committee, the League mobilized middleclass Americans in the South, both within the League and from its
collaborative allies, where conservative congressmen faced strong employer
resistance to the bill.316 The League used “southern voters to apply pressure
from home on anti-FLSA politicians.”317 Other unions lobbying for the bill
were not able to find this pressure point, but the League’s leader, then Mary
Dublin, knew to target Southern Democrats on the House Rules Committee.
Dublin “sent dozens of wires like this cryptic one” to Lucy Mason in Atlanta:
“Rules Committee deadlocked 7-7—extremely urgent you wire Rep. Cox [DGA] now opposing sending wage-hour bill to floor vital persuade others
influence do likewise.”318 The League’s network of Southern women
“signed resolutions to be read into the congressional record” and wrote
editorials in Southern papers supporting the bill.319 They also went into local
chapters of the League of Women Voters and other women’s groups to garner
support for the bill.320
Through exerting pressure like this, the League has been credited with
generating enough pressure in the South to help move conservative members
of Congress and get the bill out of committee.321 Indeed, largely as a result
of the League’s efforts, in the spring of 1938, “southerners demonstrated
sufficient enthusiasm for the FLSA in surveys and at the polls to trigger a
shift in congressional attitudes.”322 The League had also helped the cause of
those few Southerners supporting the measure. Claude Pepper of Florida and
311. Id. at 257–58.
312. Id.
313. See id. at 260.
314. See id.
315. STORRS, supra note 28, at 193–95.
316. See id. at 188–89.
317. Id.
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319. See id.
320. See id. at 194.
321. Id. at 154; see also DEBORAH M. FIGART, ELLEN MUTARI & MARILYN POWER, LIVING
WAGES, EQUAL WAGES: GENDER AND LABOR MARKET POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 104–
05 (2005).
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Lister Hill of Alabama were criticized even for their lukewarm support of the
bill, only to surprisingly win their renominations for the upcoming election
with “spectacular majorities” mobilized by the League and its sister
movements; this effort contributed to the tide change in favor of the bill.323
Thereafter, the League’s National Labor Standards Committee “obtained
thousands of signed resolutions supporting the [FLSA] from individuals
around the country.”324 League members mobilized: speaking on the radio,
writing in newspapers, calling labor committees in states across the country,
and helping to mobilize “the middle-class, intellectuals, churches, [and]
women’s organizations.”325 Convinced that “it is not labor alone which
speaks for itself” but rather the “leaders of the community in every walk of
life,” the League sought and achieved great support from many
movements.326 The League convinced the Young Women’s Christian
Association (YWCA), the National Council of Jewish Women, and the
League of Women Shoppers to endorse the bill. They joined with the
ACWA, International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union (ILGWU), and CIO
in “flood[ing]” legislators with telegrams and producing opinion pieces
signed by “hundreds of ‘leading citizens.’”327
d. Courting Labor, Again
With public momentum building, the White House then focused on labor.
In January of 1938, Perkins had called in a young lawyer, Rufus Poole, who
went out and explored the different objections labor leaders had to the bill
and worked to negotiate with them.328 In coordination with Poole and others,
the AFL began to come around.329 As Perkins recounted, negotiations made
it clear that the White House would need to better understand, and move
toward, the AFL’s position in terms of simplifying the bill. “Congressman
Griswold of Indiana drafted a bill which was said to have originated in the
[AFL] Council. This simply established a forty-hour work-week and a fortycent minimum wage in all industries.”330 The AFL bill also got rid of the
complex administrative structure and gave courts the ability to hold
responsible those who deviated from the bill.331
Given the time that the Rules Committee had freed up, a subcommittee in
the House Labor Committee was formulated to make the bill a possibility
from the AFL’s perspective.332 Through its deliberations, the committee
mostly kept to the AFL’s plan, though it added in its draft the establishment
of wage boards that would fix wages and hours gradually so as to reach the
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
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forty-hour week.333 This bill, named the Ramspeck bill, was then opposed
by the AFL because it did not favor the wage board; conversely, it was
supported by the CIO, which further exacerbated the still-existing problem
of conservative Southern Democrats, who were deeply opposed to the
CIO.334
Mary Norton, chairwoman of the House Committee on Labor, then
decided to “present a bill along the lines of the one offered by the [AFL].”335
The bill came out of the House Labor Committee favorably, on a vote of
14-4, on April 21, 1938, but, as explored above, the Rules Committee was
not yet budging, and by a vote of 8-6, did not release the bill to the floor.336
When the Rules Committee did ultimately let the bill out of committee, both
the conservative Southerners and the AFL were on board. On May 23, the
bill was sent to the floor.
3. Debate and Passage
On May 23, debate began on the House floor. Congressman Edward
Curley of the House Labor Committee argued that the legislation would
provide Americans the “security which the Constitution of the United States
of America provides for,” linking constitutional commitment and economic
security.337 Echoing Florence Kelley’s comments on how the lack of
economic security from high wages saps citizens of their self-governing
qualities, Congressman Maury Maverick picked up the republican argument
and said that low wages had drained workers of their “spirit of independence”
and had made them “docile.”338 He urged for the passage of the bill, arguing
on behalf of “upstanding, courageous Americans demanding all their
rights.”339
Congressman William Fitzgerald spoke of the bill as protecting
fundamental rights. He argued, “The wage and hour bill is an honest and
sincere effort to meet and not to avoid the just demands of the workingman
that his fundamental rights be observed.”340 To applause, Congressman
Sirovich spoke of the economic order that the bill was a part of and echoed
the League’s vision of a civilized capitalism based on firm economic rights
of citizenship.341 Channeling Kelley, he said that the bill aimed to “humanize
our economic order.”342 He continued that a worker with economic security
is “sober-minded” and “patriotic.”343 Again connecting political and
economic themes, he said that the bill would deliver on the “promissory note”
333.
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of the Declaration of Independence, which set up “a system of minimal
equality, extending into political, economic, and social realms.”344 The bill
passed the House by a vote of 313 to 97.345
The Senate and House bills now had to be reconciled. When the Senate
and House conferees discussed the bill, there was large divergence between
them. In short, the Senate bill did not contain the same extent of national
standards on wages and hours.346 Ultimately, the Southerners “yielded, and
the conference agreed upon national standards.”347 A single administrator
advised by the industries committees was chosen to set the basic standards of
wages and hours to placate the AFL, and the Wage and Hour Division was
created.348 A final compromise was to move the hour regulation from forty
to forty-four hours.349 Like the Social Security Act, however, the formation
of the FLSA suffered from built-in exclusions, such as the exclusion for
agricultural workers, which “meant the omission of more than 50 percent of
southern black employees, men and women, from coverage.”350
The FLSA was adopted by the House and Senate on June 14, 1938.351 The
Act applied to workers in interstate commerce and prohibited employing
minors, established a national minimum wage, and ensured the payment of
overtime for hours worked over forty-four hours per week. Reflecting on the
FLSA, Perkins predicted that the Act would “be a permanent part of the legal
structure and economic pattern of the United States.”352 But it had to clear a
final hurdle: the Supreme Court. The Court upheld the FLSA on interstate
commerce grounds in United States v. Darby Lumber Co.,353 in which the
Court repeatedly referred to “substandard labor conditions” that were
“injurious” to commerce and to workers.354 The Court stated that Congress
“is free to exclude from the commerce articles whose use in the states for
which they are destined it may conceive to be injurious to the public health,
morals or welfare.”355
V. INTERPRETATION AND IMPLICATIONS
Thus far, this Article has presented the related histories of the NLRA, SSA,
and FLSA. The previous three Parts focused on an overlapping set of social
344. Id.
345. See PERKINS, supra note 70, at 252–53.
346. See id.
347. Id. at 252.
348. See id. at 253. As Kate Andrias explains, the committees were “comprised of
representatives from labor, business, and the public to set wages.” Andrias, supra note 21, at
667. Andrias holds out these committees as an early model of American social democracy.
See generally id.
349. See PERKINS, supra note 70, at 253.
350. Suzanne B. Mettler, Federalism, Gender, & the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 26
POLITY 635, 646 (1994); see also Linder, supra note 21, at 1336.
351. See Mettler, supra note 350, at 651.
352. PERKINS, supra note 70, at 266.
353. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
354. Id. at 114–15.
355. Id. at 114.
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movements behind the push for each statute, their engagements with
legislators and officials, and their arguments about the purposes of the
statutes. In this Part, I draw out the constitutional purposes of the statutes as
a set at a more general level and explore how they together responded to the
problems industrialism posed to the Republic by redefining economic
freedom around worker security. I also argue that they qualify as “small c”
constitutional commitments, or “super-statutes.” I briefly explore some
implications of this argument for how courts generally interpret the statutes.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that this Part does not focus on the
history of how political, social, and economic developments and judicial
review have interacted with, and in some cases weakened, these
commitments in the past few decades. This history has been well chronicled
elsewhere and still remains to be fully chronicled,356 but this Article’s most
useful contribution is reframing the foundations and constitutional
significance of the statutes and offering some thoughts about how that
reframing can shape present debates.
A. Constitutional Purposes of the Statutes
This Article began in Part I with a description of the rise of an industrial
order that movements and political leaders believed subjected citizens to
degrees of economic insecurity that were incompatible with our
constitutional system. In this section, I explore how the statutes together
articulated a novel definition of economic freedom in the sphere of work—
freedom as worker security—to remedy this problem.
In each statutory history, the movements and lawmakers made arguments
about how providing economic freedom as security357 through these statutes
would produce citizens capable of participating in constitutional selfgovernment.358 In each statutory history, movements and legislative leaders
elaborated this theme and argued that workers would gain the security of
better working conditions from collective action, that social insurance would
diminish insecurity resulting from temporary or permanent work stoppages,
and that wage and hour laws would prevent workers from falling into the
insecurity of poverty.359 And in each history, these figures connected
security both to freedom and citizenship.360 New Deal leaders thus sought,
as FDR put it, an “economic freedom” that made “political freedom [a]
356. See supra notes 1–8 and accompanying text; see also LEE, supra note 1, at 233–37.
See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW
WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010).
357. Eskridge and Ferejohn also see “liberty as security” as a central component of the
Social Security Act’s constitutional architecture. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18,
at 90–95.
358. As I have mentioned throughout, those guarantees suffered from gender and racial
exclusions that have been partially remedied over time. See supra notes 244, 350 and
accompanying text.
359. For examples, see supra notes 60–63, 109–10, 133–35 (NLRA); supra notes 184, 247
(SSA); supra notes 337, 340 (FLSA).
360. For examples, see supra notes 51–56, 111, 134–41 (NLRA); supra notes 184–87,
204–06, 248–53 (SSA); supra notes 277–83, 337–44 (FLSA).
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reality.”361 Without economic freedom as security, workers would be
enmeshed in webs of dependence and suffer wage, workplace, and
unemployment conditions that would result in systemic insecurity, which
would sap them of the self-governing qualities the constitutional republic
requires. This is why, in the words of the Wisconsinites, “social legislation”
for workers needed to become “part of our constitution.”362
The passage of these statutes transformed the American idea of economic
freedom and its relationship to political freedom. While the founding
conception linked economic freedom as entrepreneurial “independence” to
political freedom,363 to speak of independence in an era of worker
interdependence and corporate managerial governance would have been
inapt. Citizens had become enmeshed in forms of workplace governance
rather than agrarian isolation as the wage earner replaced the citizenentrepreneur. As Part I explored, the constitutional concern of the
movements and lawmakers was that industrialism had impaired or destroyed
the balance between economic and political freedom as workers became
increasingly unable to effectively bargain with their employers, secure wage
and hour limitations that provided them with independence from the
workplace, and endure insecurity as work stopped temporarily or
permanently.
Restoring conditions of economic freedom by providing workers with
security was essential to making industrialism compatible with our
constitutional republic. As historian Eric Foner explains:
Like the Civil War, the New Deal recast the idea of freedom by linking it
to the expanding power of the national state. But now, economic security,
not the civil and political rights of the former slaves and their descendants,
dominated discussions of freedom. “Our democracy,” wrote John A. Ryan,
“finds itself . . . in a new age where not political freedom but social and
industrial freedom is the most insistent cry.”364

However, exploring the arguments of the movements and lawmakers
pushing for these statutes and placing them in their historical light shows that
the redefinition of economic freedom around security is best understood in
terms of its relationship to political freedom in the constitutional order:
economic security in a country of workers produced citizens who could
participate in constitutional self-government—that is, who could exercise
political liberty.365 Economic and political freedom remained intimately
361.
362.
363.
364.

See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
See supra note 231 and accompanying text.
See WOOD, supra note 26, at 106.
FONER, supra note 25, at 196 (quoting FRANCIS L. BRODERICK, RIGHT REVEREND NEW
DEALER: JOHN A. RYAN 195 (1963)).
365. This New Deal conception of freedom offers a useful contrast to the individualistic,
neoliberal conception of freedom that increasingly plays a large role in the American legal
order today. See Grewal & Purdy, supra note 6, at 9, 13–15; see also Jon D. Michaels, To
Promote the General Welfare: The Republican Imperative to Enhance Citizenship Welfare
Rights, 111 YALE L.J. 1457, 1459 (2002) (arguing that “basic socioeconomic resources” are
both “necessary for effective political engagement” and for “republican citizenship”).
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connected, but the former took on a new gloss. To read these statutes as a
set, then, is to speak of how they were focused on redefining economic
freedom around security in order to fill the hole that the Industrial Revolution
tore in the constitutional order. The freedom and security of workers as a
group took center stage in the American constitutional system.
B. The Statutes as Super-Statutes
The statutes are not only a set connected by their purposes; they are also a
set of “small c” constitutional commitments. William Eskridge and John
Ferejohn’s A Republic of Statutes describes a deliberative process through
which statutes become “super-statutes” that exist as part of our constitutional
framework and provides wide-ranging examples of how super-statutes have
been constructed and entrenched.366 A super-statute “emerges after a lengthy
period of public discussion and official deliberation” and becomes
entrenched after an even longer post-enactment period of interpretation,
amendment, and consensus-building.367
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue at length that the Social Security Act has
become embedded in the “small c” constitution and, in previous work,
identified the NLRA as a super-statute in passing, but their account is silent
on the connection between the statutes.368 However, Eskridge and Ferejohn
generally theorize that statutes may be related in their histories and purposes.
For example, they argue that there is a “national security constitution” and a
“green constitution,” each composed of a set of statutes.369 There is similarly
a “workers’ constitution” composed of the NLRA, SSA, and FLSA.
While my argument in this section focuses on post-enactment
entrenchment, it is worth pausing briefly to emphasize the ways in which
social movements played important roles in the initial legislative processes.
Eskridge and Ferejohn principally focus on social movements’ role in setting
the legislative agenda,370 after which the main actors in their account tend to

366. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 26.
367. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1231,
1273 (2001).
368. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 26, 171–208 (SSA); Eskridge &
Ferejohn, supra note 367, at 1227 (NLRA). Balkin also references the New Deal in discussing
how statutes become constitutional constructions. BALKIN, supra note 18, at 5, 297. He is
more general, referring to “Congress’s passage of New Deal legislation” as creating
“important constitutional constructions,” but he does not specify the full range of statutes he
would include, although he references the SSA as well. Id. at 298. Cass Sunstein also refers
to the SSA as a “constitutive commitment.” SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 179. And Ackerman
views the SSA as a “landmark” statute. 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 271.
369. See generally ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18, chs. 6, 9.
370. In their account, social movements “demand . . . state action,” after which the
demands are “translat[ed] . . . into a proposal by the legislative or executive branch of
government.” See id. at 105; see also BALKIN, supra note 18, at 17, 364 n.3 (focusing on how
congressional and executive actors “translate” movement claims). In their study of the SSA,
Eskridge and Ferejohn thus follow one influential movement, but only through the agendasetting process. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 171–208.
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be legislators, executive branch officials, and courts,371 whose deliberation
and consensus-building entrench the statute in the constitutional fabric.372
Social movement theorists focus on how movements can be involved not
only in agenda-setting but in later parts of the legislative process, including
content-specifying, drafting, and aiding passage.373 In the histories of the
New Deal statutes above, this was precisely what happened. The statutes
studied here were the product of a decades-long struggle to accommodate the
American constitutional order with corporate and industrial capitalism, and
the focus above on the exchanges and deliberations between movements and
lawmakers throughout the legislative process deepens the deliberative pool
from which to draw in establishing the statutes’ entrenchment.374
The central roles citizens played in the enactment of the statutes may even
be constitutionally significant. American constitutional politics since its
inception has been conceptualized as a process whereby the people “take
power into their own hands” and mobilize to participate in making new
fundamental commitments.375 The fact that social movements were central
actors in the legislative processes of the New Deal contributes to those
statutes attaining “small c” constitutional status because it involves the
people themselves in the deliberative process.376 This Article’s bottom-up
account of New Deal legislative constitutionalism better reveals the various
forms of deliberation and engagement which build the consensus that
entrenches the statutes. Indeed, while the post-enactment histories of the
371. Eskridge and Ferejohn specify how, post-enactment, the statute is “debated, honed,
and strengthened through an ongoing give-and-take among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches.” Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 367, at 1237.
372. Id.
373. See, e.g., Edwin Amenta, Drew Halfmann & Michael P. Young, The Strategies and
Contexts of Social Protest: Political Mediation and the Impact of the Townsend Movement in
California, 4 MOBILIZATION 1, 1 (1999).
374. See Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and
Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 68–69 (2001) (noting that the role of social
movements in the enactment of New Deal legislation “might suggest a different approach to
their interpretation and administration”). This orientation also responds to a critique of the
super-statute account. Critics have argued that scholars of legislative constitutionalism locate
the deliberation that entrenches statutes in the day-to-day horse-trading and machinations of
legislative politics in the years after the statutes are passed. See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins
& Daniel B. Rodriguez, Superstatutory Entrenchment: A Positive and Normative
Interrogatory, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 387 (2011). My approach deepens the well of
preenactment deliberation.
375. As Edward Rubin has argued, the Constitution is thus “part of a larger social process,
the product of a mobilized citizenry whose members were either attempting to achieve
particular goals or to define their own identity.” Rubin, supra note 374, at 65.
376. Id. at 68–69 (noting how popular input “supports the argument” that New Deal statutes
gain constitutional authority). A legislative-constitutionalism account more focused on the
role of citizens throughout the various stages of the preenactment legislative process can thus
show “a more direct linkage between the members of [the] political order and the decisions
made in their name.” Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States
Constitution: Tensions in the Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644, 2647 (2014).
Indeed, constitutional theorists have been critiqued for providing accounts of constitutional
change that are interested in “political leaders . . . who make decisions in the name of the
People rather than in such decisionmaking by the People themselves.” Id. at 2653.
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statutes are illuminating and central to qualifying them as super-statutes
under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s framework, arguably the most sustained and
serious forms of deliberation took place in the years and decades leading up
to their enactment because the statutes transformed the American idea of
economic freedom and the federal government’s role in securing it.
1. The NLRA
While the history leading up to the enactment of the NLRA provides a
remarkable example of the labor movement’s vision of economic freedom
and of a years-long battle over the right of workers to bargain collectively as
an expression of that freedom, post-enactment entrenchment is central to a
statute becoming a super-statute.377
The NLRA qualifies under all of the criteria that Eskridge and Ferejohn
focus on: deliberation through legislative and administrative expansion of
the statute, bipartisan support for the statute, and the interweaving of the
statute into the constitutional fabric.378 First, the NLRA received further
legislative deliberation. While it survived conservative amendments in
1939,379 the Taft-Hartley amendments of 1947 aimed to protect employer
free speech, encouraged “free choice” in collective bargaining, and
prohibited unions from discriminating against employees who did not wish
to bargain.380 While the Taft-Hartley amendments shifted some of the power
back to employers and have been subject to intense criticism,381 they did not
vitiate the core right of workers to bargain collectively and, from a
deliberative standpoint, arguably made that right more palatable to
conservatives. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, in the decade
before the Taft-Hartley amendments, unionization rates quadrupled from
about 3.6 million workers to 14.3 million workers,382 and in the decade after
its passage, the union density levels remained at about 35 percent of the
working population and remained there through the 1970s.383
Second, the NLRA’s administrative structure grew and evolved. The
NLRB withstood conservative challenge in 1940 and its structure changed
through legislative deliberation and administrative experimentation. As
regional directors were given more authority, the NLRB took on complex
economic functions, and the Office of the General Counsel was created to

377. Sam Simon also makes the case that the NLRA is a super-statute. See generally Sam
Simon, How Statutes Create Rights: The Case of the National Labor Relations Act, 15 J.
CONST. L. 1503 (2013).
378. Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 367, at 1231, 1273. See generally ESKRIDGE &
FEREJOHN, supra note 18.
379. See STORRS, supra note 28, at 211–12.
380. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(1947) (codified as amended in 29 U.S.C. §§ 147–197 (2012)); see also Cynthia L. Estlund,
The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1534 (2002).
381. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 380, at 1534.
382. See generally ARCHIBALD COX, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POLICY (1960).
383. See generally GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32553, UNION
MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES (2004).
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cordon off judicial and prosecutorial operations.384 In addition, the
Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 specified union election and reporting
mechanisms, building out the administrative information-gathering functions
of the NLRB.385
Third, the Act was supported by presidents of both major parties over time.
Truman supported collective bargaining rights to the extent of vetoing the
Taft-Hartley amendments, which were passed over his veto, and Eisenhower,
as the first Republican president after FDR, supported the collective
bargaining rights of employees as well.386 That support continued over
succeeding decades.387
And, finally, while the past thirty years have seen a decline in labor
organizing for a variety of reasons, including employer efforts to limit the
scope of collective bargaining, globalization, and the transition to a service
economy,388 the notion of a “right” of workers to bargain collectively is stuck
in constitutional culture, and indeed it has been heralded by the Supreme
Court as a “fundamental right.”389 The recent attack on public sector unions
has further weakened organized labor as a force,390 but public sector unions
were not part of the NLRA, none of the attacks go to the rights of workers to
organize and bargain, but instead chip around them, and even these efforts
are opposed by large supermajorities of citizens.391 While these are serious
threats to labor organizing, no national politician could at this time succeed
on a platform of taking away from workers the right to bargain collectively.
Indeed, the SSA survives as a super-statute under Eskridge and Ferejohn’s
account even though a president sought to privatize the system, although his
administration’s ultimate failure to do so contributes to the notion that the
“small c” right is difficult to dis-entrench.392 Recent major national
384. BERNSTEIN, supra note 63, at 663–71.
385. See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959,
Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.).
386. The Republican Party’s platform of 1956 stated, “The protection of the right of
workers to organize into unions and to bargain collectively is the firm and permanent policy
of the Eisenhower Administration.” Republican Party Platform of 1956, AM. PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1956
[https://perma.cc/Z2M5-FGXL] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
387. See, e.g., Republican Party Platform of 1980, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/republican-party-platform-1980
[https://perma.cc/E8BG-XKUE] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (“We reaffirm our commitment
to the fundamental principle of fairness in labor relations, including the legal right of unions
to organize workers and to represent them through collective bargaining . . . .”).
388. For an overview of the forces leading to organized labor’s decline, see Estlund, supra
note 380, at 1536; and see also STONE, supra note 3, chs. 4, 5.
389. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
390. See generally Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the Government Like a Business”:
Wisconsin and the Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39 (2011).
391. See, e.g., Michael Cooper & Megan Thee-Brenan, Majority in Poll Back Employees
in Public Sector Unions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/
03/01/us/01poll.html [https://perma.cc/7TZR-YH6P] (“Americans oppose weakening the
bargaining rights of public employee unions by a margin of nearly two to one: 60 percent to
33 percent.”).
392. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 205–08.
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legislative proposals seek to make it easier for employees to exercise their
right to bargain.393
At the same time, there is no doubt that the statute as a mechanism for
encouraging or facilitating worker organization has weaknesses.394 And
while the ossification or weakening of super-statutes over time is a problem
for any account of legislative constitutionalism—one I turn to in the
Conclusion—it speaks to the question of how to keep the statute functioning
well over time once it is entrenched and not whether it has become
entrenched through deliberation and consensus. That is, the question of
whether a legal norm is entrenched so it has achieved constitutional or quasiconstitutional status is separate from the question of whether the institutional
mechanisms operationalizing that commitment need to be revitalized at a
later point in time—here, some eighty years later. Undoubtedly, they do at
this point. And the ways in which citizens struggle to easily exercise that
right, and the ways in which movements are trying to attack that problem by
reshaping the structure of unions, are deeply important. But for present
purposes, the more important point is, as Cass Sunstein puts it, that “the right
to join a labor union is so deeply ingrained that its elimination would require
a large-scale change in public judgments.”395
2. The SSA
Eskridge and Ferejohn have argued at length that the SSA is a superstatute, but it is worth summarizing their claim here. While their account of
the process of passing the statute focuses more on different movements, as I
referenced above, and deviates from mine in this regard, their account of
post-enactment entrenchment is generally accurate.
Eskridge and Ferejohn argue that the SSA has “become a successfully
entrenched super statute” in part because “its norm of federally guaranteed
old-age insurance has stuck in our political culture more firmly than many
Constitutional norms.”396 And although the “Social Security Act was not
immediately internalized in the political culture,” it became so over time
“through an arduous process of successful administration, statutory
amendment, and bipartisan commissions.”397 Eskridge and Ferejohn
therefore provide an overview of the path of deliberation leading to the
limited Act of 1935; the 1939 amendments expanding its coverage and
congressional deliberation surrounding them; how the SSA then went
through administrative deliberation and survived Republican attack as
President Truman supported the program; how Congress then reaffirmed it
and expanded coverage into the 1950s; and how it was supported through
393. See generally Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach
to the Rules of Union Organizing, 123 HARV. L. REV. 655 (2010) (providing an overview of
the Employee Free Choice Act).
394. See id. See generally Estlund, supra note 380.
395. SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 62.
396. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 18, at 166.
397. Id.
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GOP control of the presidency with Eisenhower, and continued expanding
and flourishing through that decade and those to come.398 Each of these
forms of contestation, debate, and deliberation led to the SSA becoming
further entrenched in the national consciousness until it became a superstatute.
3. The FLSA
The FLSA has also become entrenched as a super-statute through
deliberation and elaboration. The Act was extended and modified over the
twenty years after its passage in a spate of legislative deliberation. Congress
passed the 1947 Portal-to-Portal Act to clarify what constituted compensable
work time.399 In 1949, Congress passed an amendment, which, among other
things, increased minimum wages and strengthened the child labor
prohibitions.400 The Act was similarly amended in 1955 and 1961 to raise
the minimum wage.401 The Equal Pay Act of 1963 extended the FLSA’s
provisions to make it illegal to pay workers less on the basis of their sex.402
A 1966 amendment raised the minimum wage and included farm workers in
the Act’s provisions.403 The Act has been amended several times since.404
In addition, the Act’s administrator—the Wage and Hour Division—has
grown to cover more administrative functions: for example, the Division
acquired the ability to sue on behalf of employees for back wages and to
regulate wages and hours with regard to other laws, including the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993.405 Finally, the Act was also supported by
Truman406 and Eisenhower,407 who were both in favor of raising the
minimum wage. While some amendments to the Act in recent years have
limited it by, for example, reclassifying “exempt” employees,408 the concepts
of prohibition on child labor, minimum wages, and overtime pay are central

398. See id. at 186–98.
399. 29 U.S.C. § 254(a) (2012).
400. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, §§ 6, 16, 63 Stat.
910, 912, 920 (increasing the FLSA minimum wage amount to 75 cents); see also William S.
Tyson, The Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949—Wage and Hour Coverage, 28 N.C.
L. REV. 161, 162 n.3 (1950) (discussing the changes in the minimum wage amount).
401. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012) (listing amendments to the FLSA in 1949, 1955,
1956, 1961, 1963, 1966, 1974, 1977, 1985, and 1989).
402. See id.
403. See id.
404. See id.
405. See id. § 209.
406. President Harry S. Truman, Statement by the President on the New 75-Cent Minimum
Wage Rate (Jan. 24, 1950), https://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=593
[https://perma.cc/DU5G-HZBH].
407. President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the
Union (Jan. 6, 1955), https://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/all_about_ike/speeches/
1955_state_of_the_union.pdf [https://perma.cc/5P4F-DNJH].
408. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).
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to the American political culture and indeed are the roots of increased
activism and democratic activity.409
C. Interpreting the Statutes
The NLRA, SSA, and FLSA are connected by the wave of movements that
fought for them, by their redefinition of economic freedom around worker
security, and by their settlement into the constitutional fabric as superstatutes. The account of these statutes I have offered thus far deviates from
the conventional account of the New Deal transformation. That account is
focused on the federal government—with FDR at the helm—seeking to pass
economic legislation, including labor and employment legislation, that would
expand the federal government’s regulatory power over the economy. This
commenced a battle that, after a long struggle, was resolved when the
judiciary acquiesced or evolved on its own with regard to the constitutionality
of federal economic legislation.
The focus on constitutional permissibility not only obscures from view the
affirmative constitutional purposes and status of the statutes. It also
potentially affects how courts interpret the statutes. Eskridge and Ferejohn,
for example, argue that courts should interpret super-statutes “broadly and
evolutively” to implement “statutory purpose and principle as well as
compromises suggested by statutory texts.”410 That means that the
underlying constitutional purposes of the statutes matter, as does fulfilling
those purposes under inevitably changing conditions. I share with other
scholars some concerns about what it means to interpret a statute “broadly”
or “evolutively.”411 I am less concerned with “purposive” interpretation
because the form is well-established in judicial practice and normatively
defensible. But since I have argued that the statutes qualify as super-statutes,
and indeed as a set of super-statutes, it is worth considering what work both
more purposive or “evolutive and broad” interpretation of the statutes could
do.
Consider the NLRA. Courts have understood its underlying purposes
differently over the years.412 Brishen Rogers has identified three concepts of

409. See generally, e.g., Sachs, supra note 21 (explaining how the FLSA has become the
channel through which the demand for worker collective action has moved).
410. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 367, at 1247; see also Kathryn E. Kovacs,
Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law, 90 IND. L.J. 1207, 1222–23 (2015).
411. See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897,
1933–34 (2013) (expressing concerns in the context of administrative constitutionalism);
Abbe Gluck, Obamacare as Superstatute, BALKINIZATION (July 29, 2017),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/07/obamacare-as-superstatute.html [http://perma.cc/2RVKRGLH] (expressing “dissatisfaction with the doctrinal implications” of the interpretive
approach).
412. See, e.g., JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW
19, 45 (1983); LEE, supra note 1, at 233–37; see also Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126
YALE L.J. 2, 17, 22–23 (2016); Cynthia L. Estlund, Labor, Property, and Sovereignty After
Lechmere, 46 STAN. L. REV. 305, 306–08 (1994).
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union freedom of association that courts have employed in interpreting it.413
One is a “social democratic” concept that focuses on worker freedom of
association and links economic freedom to political freedom.414 The social
democratic concept is faithful to the purposes of the NLRA that this Article
has elaborated. The NLRA is embedded in a set of statutes designed to
redefine economic freedom around security for workers and tie worker
security to citizenship. That is, the history of the “workers’ constitution”
both reveals the constitutional purposes of worker freedom of association and
embeds worker freedom of association in a larger constitutional
transformation connecting economic and political freedom.
Rogers explores, however, how the Supreme Court has moved from
employing the social democratic concept in interpreting the NLRA and
toward both civil libertarian415 and neoliberal416 interpretations of the statute.
Each is increasingly individualistic and removed from the statute’s
underlying purposes. Rogers argues that what is at stake in the distinction in
many cases is the vitality and strength of unions and, indeed, of the NLRA
itself. For example, he argues that the neoliberal concept would allow
free riders to opt out of paying union dues while receiving the benefits of
union representation, an issue the Supreme Court recently confronted with
regard to public sector unions.417 This approach could potentially cripple
413. See generally Brishen Rogers, Three Concepts of Workplace Freedom of Association,
37 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 177 (2016).
414. Id. at 181–82, 208–10.
415. “The civil libertarian concept . . . holds that the state may almost never compel
association in the political or expressive sphere, but may do so without limit in the economic
or commercial sphere,” and therefore generally upholds the rights of unions to, for example,
demand dues from their members. Id. at 195.
416. The neoliberal concept, recently ascendant, is the most individualistic, and it
understands worker freedom of association “as an exercise of workers’ individual wills akin
to a consumer transaction, strongly emphasizing negative [freedom of association] and
enabling positive [freedom of association] only as desired by individual workers.” Id. at 181.
417. Id. at 202–06. The Court had for several decades allowed workers to opt out of paying
the portion of fees related to unions’ political speech on First Amendment grounds, but it had
required those workers, who are still represented by unions, to pay a remaining “agency fee”
for the cost of collective bargaining. See, e.g., Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S.
735 (1988); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v.
Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961). But these cases have been successfully challenged with regard
to public sector unions. See, e.g., Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council
31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018) (holding that requiring public-sector employees to pay agency fees
violates the First Amendment); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (finding a First
Amendment right for “partial” public sector union employees to opt out of paying agency
fees). Cynthia Estlund has argued that extending Harris to public sector and private sector
unions would undermine core tenets of the New Deal constitutional settlement. See generally
Cynthia Estlund, Are Unions a Constitutional Anomaly?, 114 MICH. L. REV. 169 (2015).
Estlund argues that, as part of the New Deal settlement, unions took on legal responsibilities
for their members that are unique among voluntary associations—including agreeing to serve
as representatives for all workers within the bargaining unit and to bargain in good faith in
their interest—and that these responsibilities are the quid that justify the quo of requiring
workers to pay agency fees for the cost of collective bargaining. Id. at 171–78. And Rogers
has critiqued the decision and its potential extension as resting on a neoliberal conception of
the NLRA focused on individual opt-out rights and a novel interpretation of the First
Amendment, which deviates from the Court’s longstanding jurisprudence. See Rogers, supra
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unions that would have to represent free riders without collecting necessary
dues from them for the union to function and be effective. Rogers defends
the social democratic vision from the vantage of liberal political theory. But
this Article engages with both the constitutional struggle leading to the
statute’s enactment and frames its larger constitutional purposes. It offers
historical reasons to call into question the extent to which judges are reading
civil libertarian and neoliberal economic theories—which deviate from the
purposes of the NLRA—atop the statute.418
The Article’s framing of the purposes and context of the NLRA may also
be useful in other circumstances. For example, a broader purposive reading
of the NLRA would support the notion that unions have a collective action
right under section 7 of the statute to join together to litigate or arbitrate for
mutual aid and protection.419 Also, scholars have argued that the Supreme
Court’s expansive body of precedent allowing employers to permanently
replace striking employees has made the right to strike enshrined in the
NLRA inoperable, and an evolutive approach to interpreting the statute might
push against these decisions for undermining the statute’s purposes.420
Finally, a deeper understanding of the NLRA’s purposes could support
reading the statute to allow for minority unions, which are formed without a
majority of a workforce agreeing to be represented by a union421—a reading
that could help to revitalize labor law in an era where fashioning majority
unions is increasingly difficult because of employer advantages and tactics,
many of which are sanctioned by courts.422
Consider one other important example. The weakening of the NLRA has
been produced in part by judicial decisions making it difficult for workers to
bargain with companies that are increasingly organized in layers of subunits
note 413, at 182–83, 202–06. The claim advanced here both strengthens the social democratic
view of the NLRA advanced by Rogers and clarifies the constitutional settlement explored by
Estlund. In this way, it can be employed against extending Harris and Janus.
418. Karl Klare has similarly argued that the Court in interpreting the NLRA has limited it
to narrow goals, such as promoting industrial peace to make workplace relations more stable;
ignored the deeper purposive goals of the NLRA; and taken a narrow interpretive perspective
that benefits employers over workers by recognizing broad employer property and speech
rights and weak worker rights. See generally Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the
Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937–1941, 62 MINN. L. REV.
265 (1978).
419. The Supreme Court recently held that the NLRA’s collective action provisions were
not violated by employer-employee contracts requiring workers to arbitrate individually. See
generally Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). Before the decision issued,
Katherine Stone argued correctly that the case was going to come down in significant part to
how broadly or narrowly the NLRA is understood. Katherine V. W. Stone, Procedure,
Substance, and Power: Collective Litigation and Arbitration Under the Labor Law, 61 UCLA
L. REV. DISCOURSE 164, 173–77 (2013).
420. See generally Matthew W. Finkin, Labor Policy and the Enervation of the Economic
Strike, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 547.
421. See generally CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE BLUE EAGLE AT WORK: RECLAIMING
DEMOCRATIC RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAN WORKPLACE (2005).
422. See, e.g., Andrias, supra note 412, at 21–32 (explaining employer tactics and the
judicially imposed obstacles to forming a majority union). See generally James J. Brudney,
Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996).
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and subcontracts. Corporations have adopted “fissured” corporate structures
to make unionization difficult423 and to “diminish the potency of the NLRA
and employment law.”424 This approach is useful in thwarting organizing
insofar as the NLRA is interpreted as requiring workers to garner support to
bargain with one single employer.425 As employers have “disintegrated” into
webs of contracts and subunits, bargaining has also “disintegrated into
single-division or single-facility units.”426
This diffusion makes it difficult for workers to bargain in myriad ways.427
To take one example that Kate Andrias draws out, the fast food workers
behind the “Fight for $15” have recognized the “futility of holding
[unionization] elections at McDonald’s franchise stores on a one-off basis”
and “ha[ve] sought to define McDonald’s as the joint employer of all
McDonald’s employees.”428 They have therefore attempted “to move
responsibility for bargaining and liability up the supply chain.”429
These efforts turn on how joint employers who can be responsible for
bargaining with employers are understood under the NLRA. While the Third
Circuit and the NLRB initially interpreted “joint employers” somewhat
broadly, which made it easier for workers in fissured workplaces to bargain
with the company atop the fissured firm, in the past few decades the NLRB
changed positions and required an entity to “exercise direct, immediate, and
actual control over the terms and conditions of employment before the entity
would be considered a joint employer.”430 This interpretation of the NLRA
made it “exceedingly difficult for workers to hold liable an entity that
retaliated against them for organizing, unless that entity was their immediate
employer.”431
The Board reversed that position during the Obama administration and
returned to the more flexible previous position adopted by the Third Circuit,
but now is considering going back to its previous, more rigid view of what
constitutes a joint employer through rulemaking.432 Viewing the NLRA as
in light of its constitutional purposes and as a super-statute helps to justify
423. See STONE, supra note 3, at 290; WEIL, supra note 3, at 10.
424. Andrias, supra note 412, at 6.
425. Id. at 30; Mark Barenberg, Widening the Scope of Worker Organizing: Legal Reforms
to Facilitate Multi-Employer Organizing, Bargaining, and Striking, ROOSEVELT INST. 1, 3
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Widening-theScope-of-Worker-Organizing.pdf [http://perma.cc/JWN2-DS57].
426. Barenberg, supra note 425, at 3.
427. Id.
428. Andrias, supra note 412, at 58.
429. Andrias, supra note 9, at 1618.
430. Andrias, supra note 412, at 31 (describing the change in position); see TLI, Inc., 271
N.L.R.B. 798 (1984), overruled by Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No.
186 (Aug. 27, 2015); Laerco Transp. & Warehouse, 269 N.L.R.B. 324 (1984), overruled by
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (Aug. 27, 2015).
431. Andrias, supra note 412, at 31.
432. Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, Ltd., 365 N.L.R.B. No. 156 (Dec. 14, 2017); Lydia
Wheeler, NLRB Proposes Rule to Establish Joint-Employer Standard, HILL (Sept. 13, 2018),
https://thehill.com/regulation/court-battles/406589-nlrb-proposes-rule-to-establish-jointemployer-standard [https://perma.cc/A7CF-VDJQ].
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the Board’s earlier approach, which turns on a purposive and evolutive
reading of the NLRA.433 The narrowing of the joint employment standard,
the Obama Board found, was untrue to the purposes of the NLRA and failed
to make it functional under evolving conditions; it failed to “effectuate the
purposes of the Act . . . in the current economic landscape” in which firms
have fissured.434 Construing the NLRA otherwise would be “increasingly
out of step with changing economic circumstances, particularly the recent
dramatic growth in contingent employment relationships” and “potentially
undermines the core protections of the Act for the employees impacted by
these economic changes.”435
The Obama Board also recognized, as the Supreme Court had in the past,
the need to take an evolutive approach that would “adapt the Act to the
changing patterns of industrial life.”436 It thus held that “two or more
statutory employers are joint employers of the same statutory employees if
they ‘share or codetermine those matters governing the essential terms and
conditions of employment.’”437 This holding was consistent with the
NLRA’s definition of “employer” and the common-law standards that aid in
interpreting it.438
The fight to reinstate the previous joint employment standards reflects the
labor movement’s “aspiration to negotiate employment standards on
industrial, sectoral, and regional levels, rather than at the level of the
individual employer or even the individual supply chain.”439 The labor
movement aims to make the collective bargaining promised by the NLRA
more feasible in a changing economic world. Their fight shows how a
narrow reading of the NLRA can have damaging effects for workers in the
modern economy and contribute to the decline of unionism.
CONCLUSION
This Article has explored the rise of the New Deal worker security
provisions both in their original context and in terms of their modern
constitutional significance. I have argued that a wave of mobilization was
behind the passage of the NLRA, SSA, and FLSA, and that the statutes are
best understood as a set of “small c” constitutional commitments designed to
redefine economic freedom around worker security.
This history bears on how we conceive of the promise and limitations of
the statutes in a new era of economic constitutionalism. Americans now
inhabit a “Second Gilded Age.”440 It is one characterized by increasing
levels of economic inequality and insecurity, as well as the ossification of
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 11 (quoting NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975)).
Id. at 2.
Id. at 15–18.
Andrias, supra note 412, at 62.
See Rahman, supra note 19, at 1330; see also LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL
DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 1–28 (2008).
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many of the laws of economic security.441 In response, movements are
making new claims for redefined rights to collective action, wage
protections, and new forms of social insurance and economic protection.442
Scholars have rightly characterized their efforts as a form of “small c”
constitutionalism since they seek to make the revitalized economic security
provisions “part of the deep normative commitments that define Americans
as a political community.”443
Part of this Article’s contribution is to reset the baseline by arguing that
the economic security provisions for workers have been interconnected parts
of the nation’s deep normative commitments. Indeed, scholars note that one
goal of movements today is to “breathe new life into ossified super-statutes
of the past” by reforming labor rights, social insurance, and raising wages.444
Part of this Article’s work has been to show that these federal laws both are
super-statutes and should be understood as a complementary set.
At the same time, even with the statutes formally in place, a new era of
worker insecurity has arisen in part because legislators, courts, and
administrators have fallen short on making the statutes workable under
changing conditions. Today’s ossification suggests that it would also be
unwise to think that the formal entrenchment of a super-statute marks a sort
of end, that super-statutes retain their “small c” constitutional status in
enduring, perhaps even permanent, ways that are significant to citizens. The
reality is that citizens, legislators, courts, and administrators must play an
ongoing role in the continued interpretation and vitalization of these regimes.
To tell the worker who faces countless obstacles in exercising collective
action that the NLRA is a super-statute offers cold comfort.
Yet, like the individual workers who come together to exercise mutual aid
and protection, the power of the New Deal super-statutes is augmented by
their connection. Together, they offer a foundational model of Americans
reinterpreting their constitutional principles in light of changing social and
economic structure. They ground the idea of economic freedom as security
as an important foundation of our modern constitutional history. This idea
runs through and connects the statutes, reveals itself as a constitutive norm
that both binds the statutes and is shared over time by the broad wave of
citizens, legislators, and executive branch officials who made and entrenched
them.
In one sense, then, this Article offers a tale of lost opportunity, a failure of
courts, legislators, and executive officials in recent history to appreciate the
constitutional edifice, to elaborate and honor it. But, in another sense,
revealing the “workers’ constitution” fused in our constitutional architecture
raises the burden for those who seek to dismantle it and raises the floor for
those who seek to revitalize it.
441. See supra notes 1–5, 440.
442. Andrias, supra note 9, at 1591–94 (exploring “right-based claims . . . for higher
wages, better conditions, and unions”).
443. Id. at 1596, 1617.
444. Id. at 1618.

